The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Temporary contracts and employee effort
Abstract
Temporary contracts provide employers with a tool to screen potential new employees and have been shown to provide "stepping stones" into permanent employment for workers. For both reasons workers on temporary contracts have an incentive to provide more effort than permanent employees. Using indicators for unpaid overtime work and absences taken from the Swiss Labor Force Survey we present evidence that temporary workers indeed provide higher effort than permanent employees: Their probability of working unpaid overtime exceeds that of permanently employed workers by 60 percent. We show the heterogeneity of this effect across different types of temporary contracts, investigate differences between men and women, and discuss the relevance of adverse selection into temporary employment.
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Citations
Cites
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
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Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones or Dead Ends?
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Temporary jobs, employment protection and labor market performance
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The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: Absenteeism during and after Probation
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Self-citationThe Growth of Temporary Services Work
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Sickness Absence: An International Comparison
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Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms
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The hidden costs of fixed term contracts: the impact on work accidents
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Self-citationAn alternative look at temporary workers, their choices, and the growth in temporary employment
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Rat race redux: adverse selection in the determination of work hours
Landers, R. M., Rebitzer, J. B., & Taylor, L. J. (2011) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) · Cited by 87
Do Fixed-Term Contracts Increase the Long-Term Employment Opportunities of the Unemployed?Preprint
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Cited by
De Cuyper, N., De Jong, J., De Witte, H., Isaksson, K., Rigotti, T., & Schalk, R. (2008) · International Journal of Management Reviews · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2370.2007.00221.x · Cited by 472
The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: Absenteeism during and after Probation
Ichino, A., & Riphahn, R. T. (2005) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/1542476053295296 · Cited by 399
Self-citationEducational choices and the selection process: before and after compulsory schooling
Mocetti, S. (2012) · Education Economics · doi:10.1080/09645291003726434 · Cited by 332
Digital platforms and the changing nature of physical work: Insights from ride-hailing
Mäntymäki, M., Baiyere, A., & Islam, A. K. M. N. (2019) · International Journal of Information Management · doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2019.08.007 · Cited by 102
Metadata
- Authors
- Engellandt, A., & Riphahn, R. T.
- Venue
- Labour Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-06
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 281-299
- ISSN
- 0927-5371 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123341554
- Cited by
- 297
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 13.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.