The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
University prestige, performance evaluation, and promotion: Estimating the employer learning model using personnel datasets
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“A few international papers have also documented that college prestige serves as an entry signal that becomes less important throughout workers' careers (Lang and Siniver (2011) for Israel; Bordón and Braga (2020) for Chile; Araki, Kawaguchi, and Onozuka ( 2016”
From Employer Learning and the Dynamics of Returns to Universities: Evidence from Chinese Elite Education during University Expansion (2024) · cites this paper as Araki, Kawaguchi, and Onozuka (2016)
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Dale, S. B., & Krueger, A. B. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302320935089 · Cited by 995
The Effect of Attending the Flagship State University on Earnings: A Discontinuity-Based Approach
Hoekstra, M. (2009) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.91.4.717 · Cited by 718
Dale, S. B., & Krueger, A. B. (2014) · Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.1353/jhr.2014.0015 · Cited by 273
Estimating the Return to College Selectivity over the Career Using Administrative Earnings Data
Dale, S., & Krueger, A. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17159 · Cited by 237
Research works printed but not linked: 22
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- Araki, 2014, The promotion rule under imperfect observability of the employees ability, Theor. Econ. Lett., 4, 662, 10.4236/tel.2014.48084 · doi:10.4236/tel.2014.48084
- Ariga, 2006, Horizontal transfer, vertical promotion, and evolution of firm organization, J. Jpn. Int. Econ., 20, 20, 10.1016/j.jjie.2004.07.001 · doi:10.1016/j.jjie.2004.07.001
- Ariga, 1999, Fast track: is it in the genes? The promotion policy of a large Japanese firm, J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 38, 385, 10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00017-7 · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(99)00017-7
- Baker, 1994, The internal economics of the firm: evidence from personnel data, Q. J. Econ., 109, 881, 10.2307/2118351 · DOI · Paper page
- Brilon, 2015, Job assignment with multivariate skills and the Peter principle, Labour Econ., 32, 112, 10.1016/j.labeco.2015.01.007 · doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2015.01.007
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- Gibbons, 1991, Layoffs and lemons, J. Labor Econ., 9, 351, 10.1086/298273 · DOI · Paper page
- Gibbons, 1999, A theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms, Q. J. Econ., 114, 1321, 10.1162/003355399556287 · DOI · Paper page
- Gibbons, 2006, Enriching a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms, J. Labor Econ., 24, 59, 10.1086/497819 · DOI
- Heckman, 2006, The effects of cognitive and noncognitive abilities on labor market outcomes and social behavior, J. Labor Econ., 24, 411, 10.1086/504455 · DOI · Paper page
- Hu, 2011, Displacement, asymmetric information, and heterogeneous human capital, J. Labor Econ., 29, 113, 10.1086/656373 · DOI
- Kahn, 2013, Asymmetric information between employers, Am. Econ. J.: Appl. Econ., 5, 165
- Kahn, 2014, Employer learning, productivity and the earnings distribution: evidence from performance measures, Rev. Econ. Stud., 81, 1575, 10.1093/restud/rdu021 · DOI
- Lange, 2007, The speed of employer learning, J. Labor Econ., 25, 1, 10.1086/508730 · DOI · Paper page
- Lazear, 2004, The Peter principle: a theory of decline, J. Polit. Econ., 112, S141, 10.1086/379943 · DOI · Paper page
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- Rao, 2016, Social effects in employer learning: an analysis of siblings, Labour Econ., 38, 24, 10.1016/j.labeco.2015.11.001 · doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2015.11.001
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Cited by
Démurger, S., Hanushek, E. A., & Zhang, L. (2024) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/727519 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Araki, S., Kawaguchi, D., & Onozuka, Y.
- ORCID
- Kawaguchi, Daiji
- Venue
- Labour Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2016-08
- Volume
- 41
- Pages
- 135-148
- ISSN
- 0927-5371
- Cited by
- 14
- References
- 4
- Language
- en
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: University prestige, performance evaluation, and promotion: Estimating the employer learning model using personnel datasets. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.024
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- Araki, S., Kawaguchi, D., & Onozuka, Y. (2016). University prestige, performance evaluation, and promotion: Estimating the employer learning model using personnel datasets. Labour Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.05.024
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.