Counterfactual Reasoning Underlies the Learning of Priors in Decision Making
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Accurate decisions require knowledge of prior probabilities (e.g., prevalence or base rate), but it is unclear how prior probabilities are learned in the absence of a teacher. We hypothesized that humans could learn base rates from experience making decisions, even without feedback. Participants made difficult decisions about the direction of dynamic random dot motion. Across blocks of 15-42 trials, the base rate favoring left or right varied. Participants were not informed of the base rate or choice accuracy, yet they gradually biased their choices and thereby increased accuracy and confidence in their decisions. They achieved this by updating knowledge of base rate after each decision, using a counterfactual representation of confidence that simulates a neutral prior. The strategy is consistent with Bayesian updating of belief and suggests that humans represent both true confidence, which incorporates the evolving belief of the prior, and counterfactual confidence, which discounts the prior.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationThe Cost of Accumulating Evidence in Perceptual Decision Making
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Self-citation
Cited by
Hierarchical reasoning by neural circuits in the frontal cortex
Sarafyazd, M., & Jazayeri, M. (2019) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aav8911 · Cited by 191
“, hyperparameters) and environmental states (2, 4, 7, 53), and reduce failures by comparing new, old, and counterfactual strategies (1).”
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Self-citationManipulating prior beliefs causally induces under- and overconfidence
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Metadata
- Authors
- Zylberberg, A., Wolpert, D. M., & Shadlen, M. N.
- Venue
- Neuron
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018-09
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1083-1097.e6
- ISSN
- 0896-6273 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2775990906
- Cited by
- 62
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 4.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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