The DOI matches its Crossref record; 109 of the 109 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
My body in the brain: A neurocognitive model of body-ownership.
Abstract
Empirical research on the bodily self has only recently started to investigate how the link between a body and the experience of this body as mine is developed, maintained or disturbed. The Rubber Hand Illusion has been used as a model instance of the normal sense of embodiment to investigate the processes that underpin the experience of body-ownership. This review puts forward a neurocognitive model according to which body-ownership arises as an interaction between current multisensory input and internal models of the body. First, a pre-existing stored model of the body distinguishes between objects that may or may not be part of one's body. Second, on-line anatomical and postural representations of the body modulate the integration of multisensory information that leads to the recalibration of visual and tactile coordinate systems. Third, the resulting referral of tactile sensation will give rise to the subjective experience of body-ownership. These processes involve a neural network comprised of the right temporoparietal junction which tests the incorporeability of the external object, the secondary somatosensory cortex which maintains an on-line representation of the body, the posterior parietal and ventral premotor cortices which code for the recalibration of the hand-centred coordinate systems, and the right posterior insula which underpins the subjective experience of body-ownership. The experience of body-ownership may represent a critical component of self-specificity as evidenced by the different ways in which multisensory integration in interaction with internal models of the body can actually manipulate important physical and psychological aspects of the self.
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“First, the cerebellum is a major region contributing to the sense of body ownership, described as “a feeling of mineness” that we experience toward our body parts (Tsakiris, 2010).”
From The Forward Model: A Unifying Theory for the Role of the Cerebellum in Motor Control and Sense of Agency (2021) · cites this paper as Tsakiris, 2010
In the citing paper
“This precise temporal rule fits well with the temporal window of integration of multisensory cortical neurons12, causal inference theories of multisensory integration7,11,13, and the past body representation literature2,3,5,7–11,14,15.”
From No specific relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and the rubber hand illusion (2022) · cites this paper as [5]
In the citing paper
“Although different theoretical models of the RHI have been proposed5–7, there is substantial agreement that the RHI is a perceptual illusion that arises from a combination of bottom-up and top-down processes involved in multisensory integration.”
From No specific relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and the rubber hand illusion (2022) · cites this paper as [5]
In the citing paper
“In contrast, recent studies that investigated self-recognition of bodily movements across development [22] and the sense of body-ownership [23] emphasize the primary role of multisensory integration for body-awareness, over the role of memory of one’s body appearance.”
From The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self (2012) · cites this paper as [23]
In the citing paper
“These midline structures are involved in self-reflection, autobiographical memory processing and higher-order emotional processing and regulation ( Northoff et al., 2006 ; Tsakiris, 2010 ).”
From The brain-body disconnect: A somatic sensory basis for trauma-related disorders (2022) · cites this paper as Tsakiris, 2010
Citations
Cites
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How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness
(Bud) Craig, A. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2555 · Cited by 6,657 · cited 2×
“Other authors have also suggested that the insula is concerned with higher-order somatosensory processing of the body that is related to a subjective awareness and affective processing of bodily signals (Craig 2002, 2009; Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007).”
How do you feel? Interoception: The sense of the physiological condition of the body
Craig, A. D. (2002) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn894 · Cited by 6,006
Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35784 · Cited by 4,410
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881
Circuitry and functional aspects of the insular lobe in primates including humans
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Critchley, M. (1966) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,416
That's my hand! Activity in premotor cortex reflects feeling of ownership of a limb
Ehrsson, H. H., Spence, C., & Passingham, R. E. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1097011 · Cited by 1,348
The rubber hand illusion revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2005) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance · doi:10.1037/0096-1523.31.1.80 · Cited by 1,328
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The Sense of Embodiment in Virtual Reality
Kilteni, K., Groten, R., & Slater, M. (2012) · PRESENCE Virtual and Augmented Reality · doi:10.1162/pres_a_00124 · Cited by 1,901
Toward a second-person neuroscience
Schilbach, L., Timmermans, B., Reddy, V., Costall, A., Bente, G., Schlicht, T., & Vogeley, K. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000660 · Cited by 1,510
Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness.
Blanke, O. (2012) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3292 · Cited by 1,147
An Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence
Seth, A. K., Suzuki, K., & Critchley, H. D. (2012) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00395 · Cited by 950
“We believe considerable promise lies in integrating interoceptive predictive coding with existing proprioceptive and multisensory models of selfhood (Blanke and Metzinger,2009; Tsakiris, 2010), potentially explaining the force of “interoceptive anchors” in grounding bodily experience.”
BackgroundBehavioral, Neural, and Computational Principles of Bodily Self-Consciousness
Blanke, O., Slater, M., & Serino, A. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.029 · Cited by 698
Metadata
- Authors
- Tsakiris, M.
- Venue
- Neuropsychologia
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-02
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 703-712
- ISSN
- 0028-3932 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2037141354
- Cited by
- 1,069
- References
- 109
- Citations by year
- 2026: 53 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 64 · 2023: 78 · 2022: 74 · 2021: 102 · 2020: 79 · 2019: 87 · 2018: 76 · 2017: 65 · 2016: 66 · 2015: 59 · 2014: 60 · 2013: 61 · 2012: 35
- FWCI
- 46.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Neuropsychologia (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Royal Holloway Digital Repository (Royal Holloway University of London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Economic and Social Research Council
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Multisensory perception and integration
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Tactile and Sensory Interactions
- Keywords
- body ownership, embodiment, rubber hand illusion, multisensory integration, right temporoparietal junction, secondary somatosensory cortex, posterior parietal cortex, ventral premotor cortex, posterior insula, body schema
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Body Image, Cerebral Cortex, Cognition, Humans, Illusions, Models, Psychological, Nerve Net, Self Concept, Visual Perception, Touch Perception
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