The other in me: interpersonal multisensory stimulation changes the mental representation of the self

May combine two claims.

Synchronous IMS resulted in a unidirectional change in the self-other distinction, affecting recognition of one's own face, but not recognition of the other's face.

“Interestingly, synchronous IMS resulted in a unidirectional change in the self-other distinction, affecting recognition of one’s own face, but not recognition of the other’s face.”

May combine two claims.

Participants' autonomic responses to objects approaching the other's face were higher following synchronous than asynchronous IMS, but this increase was not specific to the pattern of IMS in interaction with the viewed object.

“The participants’ autonomic responses to objects approaching the other’s face were higher following synchronous than asynchronous IMS, but this increase was not specific to the pattern of IMS in interaction with the viewed object.”

May combine two claims.

Synchronous, as compared to asynchronous, IMS resulted in significant differences in participants' ratings of their experience, but unlike other bodily illusions, positive changes in subjective experience were related to the perceived physical similarity between the two faces, and not to identification.

“Finally, synchronous, as compared to asynchronous, IMS resulted in significant differences in participants’ ratings of their experience, but unlike other bodily illusions, positive changes in subjective experience were related to the perceived physical similarity between the two faces, and not to identification.”

May combine two claims.

The mean PSE values for the synchronous condition were 45.91±1.55 (pre-test) and 48.81±1.71 (post-test); for the asynchronous condition 46.22±1.43 (pre-test) and 45.36±1.67 (post-test).

“The mean PSE values ± SE were, for the synchronous condition 45.91±1.55 (pre-test) and 48.81±1.71 (post-test), and for the asynchronous condition 46.22±1.43 (pre-test) and 45.36±1.67 (post-test).”

May combine two claims.

Following synchronous IMS, questionnaire items Q3-6 and Q10-12 did not result in affirmative ratings, while Q1, Q2, Q7-9 resulted in low yet affirmative values.

“certain items did not result in affirmative ratings (Q3–6, Q10–12), while other items resulted in low yet affirmative values (Q1, Q2, Q7–9) following synchronous IMS.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

For the threatening object, arousal ratings did not differ significantly between synchronous and asynchronous IMS (t(38)=1.36, p=.18).

“Arousal | 5.40 (2.0) | 5.04 (2.0) | 1.36 | .18”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The knife is a threatening stimulus and the spoon is a non-threatening stimulus.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

In this study, the mean value for critical statement Q3 ("I felt as if the other's face was my face") is numerically higher than reported in previous studies.

“but it should be noted that in our study the mean value for the critical statement Q3 (“I felt as if the other’s face was my face”) is numerically higher than the ones reported in previous studies [33], [34].”

• cites [33] A Sforza, 2010, My face in yours: Visuo-tactile facial stimulation influences sense of identity., Social Neuroscience sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [34] M-P Paladino, 2010, Synchronous multisensory stimulation blurs self-other boundaries., Psychological Science sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

In Experiment 3, there was a significant difference between synchronous and asynchronous IMS, but only few statements resulted in positive affirmative ratings.

“In relation to changes in the subjective experience (Experiment 3), we observed a significant difference between the synchronous and asynchronous IMS, in line with other bodily illusions, but unlike other bodily illusions, only few statements resulted in positive affirmative ratings.”

May combine two claims.

Synchronous, as compared to asynchronous, IMS resulted in significant differences in participants' ratings of their experience, but evidence for strong and positive changes in subjective experience was limited to a change in "touch referral" and the perceived physical similarity between the two faces.

“Synchronous, as compared to asynchronous, IMS resulted in significant differences in participants’ ratings of their experience, but unlike other bodily illusions, the evidence for strong and positive changes in subjective experience was limited to a change in “touch referral” and the perceived physical similarity between the two faces.”

May combine two claims.

For statements Q3, Q4 and Q6, ratings were negative following both synchronous and asynchronous IMS, but the ratings between conditions were significantly different, indicating less negation following synchronous IMS.

“In addition, while certain statements resulted in negative ratings following both synchronous and asynchronous IMS (Q3, Q4 and Q6), the ratings between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions were significantly different, suggesting that participants showed less negation following synchronous IMS for these statements”

May combine two claims.

Following synchronous IMS, participants accepted statements referring to the source of tactile sensation (Q1, Q2) and the change in resemblance between the other's face and their own face (Q7, Q8, Q9), while they denied the same statements following asynchronous IMS.

“Following synchronous IMS, participants accepted statements referring to the source of tactile sensation (Q1, Q2) and the change in resemblance between the other’s face and their own face (Q7, Q8, Q9), while they denied the same statements following asynchronous IMS.”

May combine two claims.

The asymmetric effect for the two directions of morphing was also observed in Experiment 1, but was not found in previous studies where the other's face was a familiar one.

“This asymmetric effect for the two directions of morphing could also be observed in Experiment 1, but was not found in previous studies where the other’s face was a familiar one [32], [33].”

• cites [32] M Tsakiris, 2008, Looking for myself: Current multisensory input alters self-face recognition., PLoS One sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [33] A Sforza, 2010, My face in yours: Visuo-tactile facial stimulation influences sense of identity., Social Neuroscience sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Synchronous IMS specifically affected recognition of the self-face, as statistically significant changes were observed only for the direction of morphing that presented a transition from other to self.

“Synchronous IMS specifically affected recognition of the self-face, as statistically significant changes were observed only for the direction of morphing that presented a transition from other to self.”

May combine two claims.

Our results show that morphed instances of the other's face are perceived as self-stimuli, whereas morphed instances of the self-face are not perceived as other-stimuli.

“Consistent with this pattern, our results show that morphed instances of the other’s face are perceived as self-stimuli, whereas morphed instances of the self-face are not perceived as other-stimuli.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The ability to recognize oneself in a mirror is taken as evidence of a basic form of self-awareness in non-human primates and human infants.

“The ability to recognize oneself in a mirror is taken as evidence of a basic form of self-awareness in non-human primates [1], [3] and human infants [4].”

• cites [1] GGJ Gallup, 1970, Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition., Science sourceNot checked yet

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• cites [3] FB de Waal, 2005, The monkey in the mirror: Hardly a stranger., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America sourceNot checked yet

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• cites [4] BI Bertenthal, 1978, Development of self-recognition in the infant., Child DevelopmentNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Changes in autonomic responses and in the subjective experience of self-identification were broadly consistent with patterns observed in other bodily illusions, but less robust.

“Changes in autonomic responses and in the subjective experience of self-identification were broadly consistent with patterns observed in other bodily illusions, but less robust.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Uddin et al. [11] reported activations in the right inferior parietal lobule, inferior frontal gyrus and inferior occipital gyrus during self-face recognition.

“For example, Uddin et al. [11] reported activations in the right inferior parietal lobule, inferior frontal gyrus and inferior occipital gyrus.”

• cites [11] LQ Uddin, 2004, Self-face recognition activates a frontoparietal “mirror” network in the right hemisphere: an event-related fMRI study., NeuroImageNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Self-face recognition is fundamental to the awareness of being a self among others like us, upon which more complex forms of self-identity are built, such as a diachronic sense of self, and the expression of social emotions.

“This ability for self-face recognition is also claimed to be fundamental to the awareness of being a self among others like us [5], upon which more complex forms of self-identity are built, such as a diachronic sense of self [6], and the expression of social emotions (e.g., embarrassment, pride and guilt [7]).”

• cites [5] D Zahavi, 2011, Faces and ascriptions: mapping measures of the self., Conscious & Cognition sourceNot checked yet

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• cites [6] DJ Povinelli, 1998, Young children's understanding of briefly versus extremely delayed images of self: Emergence of the autobiographical stance., Developmental Psychology sourceNot checked yet

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• cites [7] M Lewis, 2006, The emergence of consciousness and its role in human development., Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences sourceNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Accumulating evidence favors a right hemispheric specificity in frontoparietal areas responsible for self-face recognition.

“Accumulating evidence favors a right hemispheric specificity in frontoparietal areas responsible for self-face recognition [8].”

• cites [8] SJ Gillihan, 2005, Is self special? A critical review of evidence from experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience., Psychological Bulletin sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Overall, shared multisensory experiences between self and other can change the mental representation of one's identity, and the perceived similarity of others relative to one's self.

“Overall, shared multisensory experiences between self and other can change the mental representation of one’s identity, and the perceived similarity of others relative to one’s self.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Mirror self-recognition is a key feature of self-awareness and identity.

“Mirror self-recognition is a key feature of self-awareness and identity [1], [2].”

• cites [1] GGJ Gallup, 1970, Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition., Science sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [2] P Rochat, 2011, The uncanny mirror: A re-framing of mirror self-experience., Consciousness & Cognition sourceNot checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

In the rubber hand illusion, synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation between a rubber hand and one's own unseen hand generates the feeling that the rubber hand is part of one's body.

“In the rubber hand illusion (RHI), synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation between a rubber hand and one’s own unseen hand generates the feeling that the rubber hand is part of one’s body [25].”

• cites [25] M Botvinick, 1998, Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see., Nature sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The self-recognition task, in which participants gave judgments for single pictures without being aware of the direction of change, avoids potential errors of habituation and/or anticipation due to cognitive expectations.

“This task, in which participants were required to give judgments for single pictures, without being aware of the direction of change from one picture to the other, avoids potential errors of habituation and/or anticipation due to cognitive expectations [36].”

• cites [36] TS Meese, 1995, Using the standard staircase to measure the point of subjective equality: A guide based on computer simulations., Perception & Psychophysics sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

These findings are compatible with the behavioral results of Tsakiris [32] and Sforza et al. [33], but importantly, they show, for the first time, that IMS between one's own face and a completely unknown face can affect the mental representation of one's own face.

“These findings are compatible with the behavioral results of Tsakiris [32] and Sforza et al. [33], but importantly, they show, for the first time, that IMS between one’s own face and a completely unknown face can affect the mental representation of one’s own face.”

• cites [32] M Tsakiris, 2008, Looking for myself: Current multisensory input alters self-face recognition., PLoS One sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [33] A Sforza, 2010, My face in yours: Visuo-tactile facial stimulation influences sense of identity., Social Neuroscience sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Behavioral research emphasizes the role of mnemonic representations of one's face, suggesting that I recognize myself in the mirror because I know the person I see looks like me.

“Behavioral research emphasizes the role of mnemonic representations of one’s face [17]–[21], suggesting that I recognize myself in the mirror because I know the person I see looks like me.”

• cites [17]–[21]Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Sforza et al. [33] used exposure to visuo-tactile stimulation delivered to the participant's face and the familiar face of a friend or colleague who was physically present.

“Similar effects were reported in the description of the “enfacement illusion” by Sforza et al. [33], who used exposure to visuo-tactile stimulation delivered to the participant’s face and, unlike Tsakiris [32], the familiar face of a friend or colleague who was physically present.”

• cites [33] A Sforza, 2010, My face in yours: Visuo-tactile facial stimulation influences sense of identity., Social Neuroscience sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Sforza et al. [33] used a familiar face during visuo-tactile stimulation and lacked a baseline self-recognition task prior to stimulation.

“Sforza et al. [33] used a familiar face during visuo-tactile stimulation and lacked a baseline self-recognition task prior to stimulation;”

• cites [33] A Sforza, 2010, My face in yours: Visuo-tactile facial stimulation influences sense of identity., Social Neuroscience sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Heinisch et al. [16] found that rTMS over the right TPJ, but not over the left TPJ, biased self-other discrimination but only in the 'other to self' direction of morphing, without any effect on the 'self to other' direction.

“rTMS over the right TPJ, but not over the left TPJ, biased self-other discrimination but only in the “other to self” direction of morphing, without any effect on the “self to other” direction of morphing.”

• cites [16] C Heinisch, 2010, An rTMS study into self-face recognition using video-morphing technique., Social Cognitive and Affective NeuroscienceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Comparable findings have been shown after multisensory stimulation of whole bodies and in the body-swap illusion.

“Comparable findings have been shown after multisensory stimulation of whole bodies [26]–[29] and in the body-swap illusion [30].”

• cites [26]–[29]Not checked yet

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• cites [30] VI Petkova, 2008, If I were you: Perceptual illusion of body swapping., PLoS ONE sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

EDA is a sensitive and valid indicator for the low arousal range, reflecting small variations in response to arousing stimuli.

“EDA is a sensitive and valid indicator for the low arousal range, reflecting small variations in response to arousing stimuli [40], while heart rate deceleration (HRD) is a valid real-time measure for the higher arousal range and attention.”

• cites [40] W Boucsein, 1992, Electrodermal activity. sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

When people experience ownership over a foreign body, as a result of multisensory stimulation, they also exhibit increased physiological responses to threatening stimuli approaching the body that is attributed to the self.

“When people experience ownership over a foreign body, as a result of multisensory stimulation, they also exhibit increased physiological responses to threatening stimuli approaching the body that is attributed to the self [30].”

• cites [30] VI Petkova, 2008, If I were you: Perceptual illusion of body swapping., PLoS ONE sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Uddin et al. [15] used rTMS over the right inferior parietal lobe, which selectively disrupted performance on a self-other discrimination task, whereas rTMS to the left IPL had no effect.

“To further investigate the causal role of these areas in self-other discrimination, Uddin et al. [15] used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over the right inferior parietal lobe (rIPL), which selectively disrupted performance on a self-other discrimination task, whereas rTMS to the left IPL had no effect.”

• cites [15] LQ Uddin, 2006, rTMS to the right inferior parietal lobule disrupts self-other discrimination., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Devue et al. [12] reported that visual self-recognition of both faces and bodies activated the right inferior frontal gyrus and the right insula.

“Devue et al. [12] reported that visual self-recognition of both faces and bodies activated the right inferior frontal gyrus and the right insula (see also [13], [14]).”

• cites [12] C Devue, 2007, Here I am: The cortical correlates of visual self- recognition., Brain Research sourceNot checked yet

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• cites [13] TTJ Kircher, 2001, Recognizing one’s own face., Cognition sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [14] LQ Uddin, 2005, Split-brain reveals separate but equal self-recognition in the two cerebral hemispheres., Consciousness & Cognition sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Paladino et al. [34] exposed participants to visuo-tactile stimulation delivered to their face and another unfamiliar face, and showed that synchronous multisensory stimulation might also influence social cognition processes of inference and conformity, and the perceived physical resemblance between one's own and the other's face.

“Extending the behavioral results of Tsakiris [32] and Sforza et al. [33], Paladino et al. [34] exposed participants to visuo-tactile stimulation delivered to their face and another unfamiliar face, and showed that synchronous multisensory stimulation might also influence social cognition processes of inference and conformity, and the perceived physical resemblance between one’s own and the other’s”

• cites [34] M-P Paladino, 2010, Synchronous multisensory stimulation blurs self-other boundaries., Psychological Science sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Previous research from similar bodily illusions (RHI) suggests that on average the illusion onset takes place approximately after 12 s of stimulation.

“Previous research from similar bodily illusions (RHI) suggests that on average the illusion onset takes place approximately after 12 s of stimulation [39].”

• cites [39] HH Ehrsson, 2004, That's my hand! Activity in premotor cortex reflects feeling of ownership of a limb., Science sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Paladino et al. [34] lacked a behavioral self-recognition task and did not control for the gender of the viewed model.

“and Paladino et al. [34] lacked a behavioral self-recognition task and did not control for the gender of the viewed model.”

• cites [34] M-P Paladino, 2010, Synchronous multisensory stimulation blurs self-other boundaries., Psychological Science sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

The first psychophysical task (Experiment 1) was designed to minimize the effect of cognitive expectations on the performance of the self-recognition task.

“The first psychophysical task (Experiment 1) was designed to minimize the effect of cognitive expectations on the performance of the self-recognition task.”

May combine two claims.

Changes in EDA normally occur between 1 and 2 s after stimulus onset, although the response can be delayed up to 5 s.

“changes in EDA are not as immediate as those in heart response, but they normally occur between 1 and 2 s after stimulus onset, although the response can be delayed up to 5 s [45].”

• cites [45] R Edelberg, 1967, Electrical properties of the skin.Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation altered self-face representations, producing changes in recognition of the self-face, while recognition of the other's face was not affected.

“Experiment 4 shows that synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation altered self-face representations, by producing changes in the recognition of the self-face, while recognition of the other’s face was not affected.”

May combine two claims.

Tsakiris [32] and Sforza et al. [33] failed to find significant differences between self-recognition changes for the "self to other" and "other to self" directions and between judgments under different instruction conditions.

“This issue was investigated by Tsakiris [32] and Sforza et al. [33], who failed to find significant differences between self-recognition changes for the “self to other” and “other to self” directions [32] and between the judgments given under different instruction conditions (e.g., to evaluate the amount of “self” or to evaluate the amount of “other” contained in the morphs) [33].”

• cites [32] M Tsakiris, 2008, Looking for myself: Current multisensory input alters self-face recognition., PLoS One sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [33] A Sforza, 2010, My face in yours: Visuo-tactile facial stimulation influences sense of identity., Social Neuroscience sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

The results might indicate a specific change in the perceived similarity of the other face relative to self, but not the reverse.

“These results might also indicate a specific change in the perceived similarity of the other face relative to self, but not the reverse, as discussed below.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Seeing a knife is generally significantly more arousing than seeing a spoon.

“the experience of seeing a knife is generally significantly more arousing than the experience of seeing a spoon (e.g., [47])”

• cites [47] PJ Lang, 2008, International affective picture system (IAPS): Affective ratings of pictures and instruction manual. Technical Report A-8.Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

The observed changes in HRD might reflect a general modulation of attention by visuo-tactile stimulation, independent of the kind of object, with synchronous IMS resulting in greater HRD.

“The observed changes in HRD might reflect the general modulation of attention of visuo-tactile stimulation, independent of the kind of object that appeared, with synchronous IMS resulting in greater HRD.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

None of the factors passed the normality test, so non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test) were used.

“None of the factors passed the normality test, therefore we used non-parametrical statistical tests to analyze the data (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Previous studies on the RHI have reported changes in the perceived similarity between felt and seen bodies whereby the rubber hand is perceived to become more similar to one's own hand.

“Previous studies on the RHI have reported changes in the perceived similarity between felt and seen bodies whereby the rubber hand is perceived to become more similar to one’s own hand [24], [49].”

• cites [24] MR Longo, 2009, Self awareness and the body image., Acta Psychologica sourceNot checked yet

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• cites [49] MR Longo, 2008, What is embodiment? A psychometric approach., Cognition sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

The change in self-face recognition was similar but subjectively not as strong as changes observed in other body-illusions that use multisensory stimulation to manipulate body-awareness.

“This change was similar but subjectively not as strong as those changes observed in other body-illusions that use multisensory stimulation to manipulate body-awareness [24], [49].”

• cites [24] MR Longo, 2009, Self awareness and the body image., Acta Psychologica sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [49] MR Longo, 2008, What is embodiment? A psychometric approach., Cognition sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Other bodily illusions (e.g., RHI) produce stronger phenomenological effects than IMS, as reported by participants.

“although it seems that other bodily illusions (e.g., RHI) produce stronger phenomenological effects, as reported by participants.”

• cites [49] MR Longo, 2008, What is embodiment? A psychometric approach., Cognition sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Experiment 1 was designed to control for potential confounds reported in previous studies, such as the use of a familiar face and the lack of a pre-test baseline self-recognition performance.

“Experiment 1 was designed to control for potential confounds reported in previous studies, such as the use of a familiar face [32], [33] and the lack of a pre-test baseline self-recognition performance [33].”

• cites [32] M Tsakiris, 2008, Looking for myself: Current multisensory input alters self-face recognition., PLoS One sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [33] A Sforza, 2010, My face in yours: Visuo-tactile facial stimulation influences sense of identity., Social Neuroscience sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The observed larger HRD during synchronous, as compared to asynchronous, IMS might reflect an increase in attention towards the other's face.

“The observed larger HRD during synchronous, as compared to asynchronous, IMS, might reflect an increase in attention [41] towards the other’s face.”

• cites [41] PJ Lang, 1990, Emotion attention and the startle reflex., Psychological Review sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Overall affirmative ratings on questions about perceived similarity of the other's face (Q7-9) following synchronous IMS point to a key change in subjective experience and are consistent with the behavioral pattern.

“In addition, the overall affirmative ratings in questions relating to the perceived similarity of the other’s face (see Q7–9) following synchronous IMS point to a key change in subjective experience and are consistent with the behavioral pattern as discussed below.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The items reflecting touch referral are important because touch referral has been implicated in the inducement of similar bodily illusions.

“These items are important as they reflect the subjective experience of a key process of “touch referral” that has been implicated in the inducement of similar bodily illusions [53].”

• cites [53] TR Makin, 2008, On the other hand: Dummy hands and peripersonal space., Behavioural Brain Research sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

The increase in arousal is threat-related and not only due to the general effect of seeing an object approaching the face after synchronous IMS.

“which shows that the increase in arousal is threat-related and not only due to the general effect of seeing an object approaching the face after synchronous IMS.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The pattern of subjective experience changes is consistent with other studies on multisensory stimulation in face recognition.

“Overall, this pattern is consistent with the reported changes in subjective experience in other studies reporting the influence of multisensory stimulation in face recognition [33], [34]”

• cites [33] A Sforza, 2010, My face in yours: Visuo-tactile facial stimulation influences sense of identity., Social Neuroscience sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [34] M-P Paladino, 2010, Synchronous multisensory stimulation blurs self-other boundaries., Psychological Science sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The concern about attentional modulation identifies a potential confound that requires an additional control condition with synchronous IMS but without changes in face representation.

“This concern identifies a potential confound that requires an additional control condition with synchronous IMS but without changes in face representation.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

In the rubber hand illusion, synchronous multisensory stimulation applied to a rubber hand in an incongruent posture does not elicit ownership.

“That would be analogous to the one used in the rubber hand illusion where, for example, synchronous multisensory stimulation is applied to a rubber hand that is placed in an incongruent posture with respect to the participant’s hand, a condition that does not elicit ownership [52].”

• cites [52] A Guterstam, 2011, The illusion of owning a third arm., PLoS ONE sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

The statements that resulted in positive affirmative ratings focused mainly on the perceived physical similarity between self and other, corroborating the behavioral findings.

“These were the ones that focused mainly on the perceived physical similarity between self and other, corroborating thus the behavioral findings.”

May combine two claims.

A previous study measuring HRD in response to a person being threatened observed from first- and third-person-perspective did not find a significant difference in HRD to the threat after synchronous vs asynchronous touch, but only found differences between first- and third-person-perspective.

“It should be noted that a previous study which measured HRD in response to a person being threatened, observed from first- and third-person-perspective, did not find a significant difference in HRD to the threat occurring after synchronous as compared to the asynchronous touch condition, but they only found differences in HRD between the conditions when the person threatened was observed from first”

• cites [51] M Slater, 2010, First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality., PLoS ONE sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Despite the lack of a significant interaction, planned contrasts provide tentative support for an effect of synchronous IMS on autonomic reactivity related to stimuli approaching the other's face, perhaps more so for threatening stimuli.

“Therefore, despite the lack of a significant interaction, these planned contrasts provide some tentative support for an effect of synchronous IMS on autonomic reactivity related to stimuli, and perhaps more so for threatening stimuli, approaching the other’s face.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The lack of a significant interaction in EDA does not invalidate the planned contrasts as tentative support for an effect of synchronous IMS on autonomic reactivity.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

During synchronous IMS, a strong binding between one's own tactile experiences and the visual impact on the other face results in increased attention to the other face, which can explain the higher EDA responses.

“For example, during synchronous IMS, a strong binding between one’s own tactile experiences and the visual impact on the other face results in increased attention to the other face, which can in turn explain the higher EDA responses as confirmed by the significant main effect of stimulation.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

When the two end-points of a continuum are the self-face and an unknown face, categorical boundaries are dependent on perceived face similarity between self and other but not on the direction of morphing.

“For example, it has been found that when the two end-points of a continuum are the self-face and an unknown face, the categorical boundaries are dependent on the perceived face similarity between self and other but not on the direction of morphing [13], [54]–[56].”

• cites [13] TTJ Kircher, 2001, Recognizing one’s own face., Cognition sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

• cites [54]–[56]Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Previous studies failed to find significant differences between self-recognition changes for the "self to other" and "other to self" directions in a video morphing task, and between judgments under different instruction conditions.

“Previous studies failed to find significant differences between self-recognition changes for the “self to other” and “other to self” directions in a video morphing from one face to the other [32], a task identical to the one used in our Experiment 4, and between the judgments of morphed images under different instruction conditions (either to evaluate the amount of “self” or to evaluate the amount”

• cites [32] M Tsakiris, 2008, Looking for myself: Current multisensory input alters self-face recognition., PLoS One sourceNot checked yet

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• cites [33] A Sforza, 2010, My face in yours: Visuo-tactile facial stimulation influences sense of identity., Social Neuroscience sourceNot checked yet

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Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Disrupting neural processing in rTPJ makes self-recognition performance less conservative (increasing likelihood of accepting other faces as one's own face), while other-face recognition is unaffected.

“Heinisch et al. [16] argued that disrupting neural processing in rTPJ makes self-recognition performance less conservative (i.e., increasing the likelihood of accepting other faces as one’s own face), while other-face recognition is unaffected (i.e., the likelihood of judging one’s own face as that of someone else is not changing).”

• cites [16] C Heinisch, 2010, An rTMS study into self-face recognition using video-morphing technique., Social Cognitive and Affective NeuroscienceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Synchronous IMS can elicit an asymmetric effect, such that the other's face is perceived as self-face, while the reverse did not occur.

“Aside from the rTMS study over the rTPJ that showed an asymmetric effect on categorical boundaries depending also on the direction of morphing [16], we show that synchronous IMS can also elicit an asymmetric effect, such that the other’s face is perceived as self-face, while the reverse did not occur.”

• cites [16] C Heinisch, 2010, An rTMS study into self-face recognition using video-morphing technique., Social Cognitive and Affective NeuroscienceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

It has been suggested that the perceived similarity of other people to one's self is the starting point for inferring that others have similar psychological processes, including perceptions and emotions, as one's self.

“It has been suggested that the perceived similarity of other people to one’s self is the starting point for inferring that others have similar psychological processes, including perceptions and emotions, as one’s self (see the “like me” process [57]).”

• cites [57] AN Meltzoff, 2007, 'Like me': A foundation for social cognition., Developmental Science sourceNot checked yet

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May combine two claims.

Our results provide further support to theories that perceived similarity of others to self underlies inference of similar psychological processes, because following synchronous IMS the "other" is perceived to be more "like me".

“Our results provide further support to these theories because following synchronous IMS, the “other” is perceived to be more “like me”.”

May combine two claims.

Synchronous IMS reverses the pattern for unfamiliar faces by shifting categorical boundaries towards the unfamiliar face, suggesting that a higher percentage of the other face is assimilated in the mental representation of the self-face.

“Here, we used an unfamiliar face, and synchronous IMS seems to reverse this pattern by shifting categorical boundaries towards the unfamiliar face, suggesting that a higher percentage of the other face is assimilated in the mental representation of the self-face.”

May combine two claims.

This change depends on the interaction of the pattern of stimulation and the direction of morphing, making the other's face perceived as self-face.

“Moreover, this change depends on the interaction of the pattern of stimulation and the direction of morphing (Experiment 4), that makes the other’s face to be perceived as self-face.”

May combine two claims.

Insula activations in the right hemisphere have been reported during bodily illusions of body-ownership caused by multisensory integration, during self-face recognition, and during mapping of observed bodily states on one's own body.

“Insula activations in the right hemisphere have been reported during bodily illusions of body-ownership caused by multisensory integration [61], as well as during self-face recognition [12], and the mapping of observed bodily states on one’s own body [62].”

• cites [61] M Tsakiris, 2007, Neural signatures of body ownership: a sensory network for bodily self-consciousness., Cerebral Cortex sourceNot checked yet

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• cites [12] C Devue, 2007, Here I am: The cortical correlates of visual self- recognition., Brain Research sourceNot checked yet

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• cites [62] T Singer, 2004, Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain., Science sourceNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Uddin et al. suggest that there are at least two neural networks involved in representing self and others.

“Uddin et al. [59] suggest that there are at least two neural networks involved in representing self and others.”

• cites [59] LQ Uddin, 2007, The self and social cognition: the role cortical midline structures and mirror neurons., Trends in Cognitive Sciences sourceNot checked yet

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Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

This mapping may also depend on the perceived physical similarity between self and other.

“This mapping may also depend on the perceived physical similarity between self and other [65].”

• cites [65] A Avenanti, 2010, Racial bias reduces empathic sensorimotor resonance with other-race pain., Current Biology sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Paladino et al. showed that IMS altered social perception: following synchronous vs. asynchronous IMS, participants reported higher self-other merging and tended to conform more with the other.

“For example, Paladino et al. [34], using an experimental paradigm similar to ours, showed that IMS altered the social perception of participants towards the other person: following synchronous vs. asynchronous IMS, participants reported a higher self-other merging measured in terms of inner states, closeness and physical attraction, and they tended to conform more with the other.”

• cites [34] M-P Paladino, 2010, Synchronous multisensory stimulation blurs self-other boundaries., Psychological Science sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

This model provides a functional explanation of how the "I" comes to be identified with "me", allowing this "me" to be represented as an object for the others, but also for one's own self.

“This model provides a functional explanation of how the “I” comes to be identified with “me”, allowing this “me” to be represented as an object for the others, but also for one’s own self.”

May combine two claims.

Evidence for changes in autonomic responses and in the subjective experience of self-identification were broadly consistent with patterns observed in other bodily illusions, but they were not as potent.

“Evidence for changes in autonomic responses and in the subjective experience of self-identification were broadly consistent with patterns observed in other bodily illusions, but they were not as potent.”

May combine two claims.

The frontoparietal mirror neuron system is involved in processing the physical self, and a network of cortical midline structures is involved in more abstract, evaluative processing of self and others.

“The frontoparietal mirror neuron system (MNS), which is involved in processing the physical self [11], and a network composed of the cortical midline structures (CMS) including the medial prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex and the precuneus which is involved in the more abstract, evaluative processing of self and others.”

• cites [11] LQ Uddin, 2004, Self-face recognition activates a frontoparietal “mirror” network in the right hemisphere: an event-related fMRI study., NeuroImageNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

The right TPJ has been shown to engage in filtering multisensory percepts that may be assigned to one's own body or not, and in maintaining a 1st person perspective.

“Finally, the right TPJ has been shown to engage in the filtering of multisensory percepts that may be assigned to one’s own body or not [63] and in the maintenance of a 1st person perspective [64].”

• cites [63] M Tsakiris, 2008, The role of the right temporo-parietal junction in maintaining a coherent sense of one's body., Neuropsychologia sourceNot checked yet

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• cites [64] S Ionta, 2011, Multisensory mechanisms in temporo-parietal cortex support self-location and first-person perspective., Neuron sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

These results suggest that self-other distinction and recognition of the physical self might be based upon specific processes of multisensory perception.

“These results suggest that self-other distinction and recognition of the physical self might be based upon specific processes of multisensory perception.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Ishida et al. showed that visuo-tactile neurons in the parietal cortex display mirroring properties and can be used to link self and other body representations.

“For example, Ishida et al. [60] showed that visuo-tactile neurons in the parietal cortex display mirroring properties and can be used to link self and other body representations.”

• cites [60] H Ishida, 2010, Shared mapping of own and others' bodies in visuotactile bimodal area of monkey parietal cortex., Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

This change in perceived similarity is caused by the synchrony of multisensory stimuli, which in the context of body-awareness has been shown to determine whether external stimuli can be experienced as part of the self or not.

“This change in perceived similarity is caused by the synchrony of multisensory stimuli, which in the context of body-awareness has been shown to determine whether external stimuli can be experienced as part of the self or not [25].”

• cites [25] M Botvinick, 1998, Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see., Nature sourceNot checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Multisensory integration provides a plausible mechanism for constructing a self-representation, and for the subsequent assimilation of changes and updating of self-representations.

“Multisensory integration provides a plausible mechanism for constructing a self-representation, and for the subsequent assimilation of changes and updating of self-representations.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Representations of self-identity must possess sufficient plasticity to ensure both the assimilation of changes and a sense of continuity over time.