CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 31Housing Market and EconomicsUrban, Neighborhood, and Segregation StudiesHousing, Finance, and Neoliberalism

Effectiveness and supply effects of high-coverage rent control policies

Open access
Jofre-Monseny, Jordi, Martínez-Mazza, Rodrigo, Segú, Mariona·2023·Regional Science and Urban Economics
DOI 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2023.103916
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

Concerns about housing affordability are widespread in cities worldwide, prompting discussions about rent control policies. This paper studies the effects of a rent control policy adopted in Catalonia in 2020 that applied to some but not all municipalities. The policy virtually covered all the rental market and forced ads and tenancy agreements to specify the applicable rent cap to ensure enforcement. To identify the causal effect of the rent control regulation on the rental market, we exploit register microdata of tenancy agreements and implement difference-in-differences regressions and event-study designs. Our results indicate that the regulation reduced average rents paid by about 4% to 6%. We do not find evidence of a reduction in the supply of rental units, as measured by the number of signed and ended agreements or the active stock of rental units. We implement several robustness tests to address identification concerns related to Covid-19. Our results suggest that rent control policies can effectively reduce rental prices without necessarily shrinking the rental market.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

A 2020 Catalonia rent control policy that covered virtually the entire rental market reduced average rents by about 4–6% in regulated municipalities relative to non-regulated tight-market municipalities. The paper finds no evidence of a short-run reduction in rental supply, as measured by signed agreements, ended agreements, or the active stock of rented units.

Key findings

  • Rent control reduced average rents paid by about 4% to 6%; the preferred quarterly difference-in-differences estimate is −4.5% (about €30 per month or €358 annually), while weekly data yield a slightly larger 5% reduction.
  • The policy did not significantly reduce the number of tenancy agreements signed, ended agreements, or the active stock of rented units; there was an anticipation effect, with signed agreements rising 13% in the third quarter of 2020 and 17% in the two weeks before implementation.
  • Sales prices were not affected, but the number of sales fell by about 7%; the authors report this result is less robust across specifications and samples.
  • Neighboring non-regulated municipalities experienced a rent reduction of about 2.7%, consistent with a contagion effect, suggesting baseline price estimates may be a lower bound.

Methods

  • Uses administrative register microdata from the Catalan Housing Agency and INCASOL covering the universe of tenancy agreements signed and ended in Catalonia between 2016 and 2022, aggregated at the municipality-quarter level, plus IDESCAT housing sales data and labor-market/migration controls.
  • Main sample: 58 regulated and 90 non-regulated municipalities (148 total), excluding Barcelona and partially treated municipalities; control group includes only municipalities meeting the tight-housing-market criterion but not the population threshold.
  • Difference-in-differences and event-study designs compare regulated vs. non-regulated municipalities, with municipality and time fixed effects, controls for unemployment, Covid-19 furloughs, and new employment contracts, and standard errors clustered at the municipality level; robustness checks address Covid-19 confounding, spillovers, alternative samples, weekly data, and the policy’s end.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the policy’s short-lived nature (ended March 2022) does not allow identification of long-term supply effects, including potential reductions in new housing units built.
  • The authors state that the negative effect on the number of sales is not robust across specifications and samples, calling for caution in its interpretation.
  • The text makes evident that control municipalities may be affected by spillovers/contagion, that Barcelona was excluded due to its size and tourism economy, that ended-agreement and active-stock measures are reliable only from 2019 onward, and that weekly rent regressions use an unbalanced sample because many municipalities have zero agreements in many weeks.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2023.103916

Cites

19 of 19 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

1 of 7 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

  • Premisecitation
    § 6.2 The potentially confounding effects of Covid-19 · p. 21

    In US cities, Covid-19 has reduced housing rents and prices in central city locations relative to the suburbs.

    “Gupta et al. (2021) and Ramani and Bloom (2021) show that, in US cities, Covid-19 has reduced housing rents and prices in central city locations relative to the suburbs”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Gupta et al. (2021) source
    • cites Ramani and Bloom (2021) source

      The Introduction (p. 3) reports that rents and home-price growth in central business districts fell relative to lower-density areas in the largest 12 US metros. The Conclusion (p. 13) says there is no evidence of this effect in smaller cities, so the unqualified reference to US cities is broader than the paper's finding. (LLM, conf=0.86)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Findingown data
    § 1 Introduction · p. 4

    The number of tenancy agreements in neighboring non-regulated municipalities was unaffected by rent control.

    “In contrast, the number of tenancy agreements in neighboring municipalities is unaffected by rent control.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § 5.1 Baseline results · p. 13

    In the third quarter of 2020, the number of signed agreements in regulated municipalities increased by 13%.

    “In column 6, the results indicate that in regulated municipalities, there was a 13% increase in the number of signed agreements in the third quarter of 2020.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, regulated and non-regulated municipalities would have followed parallel trends in rental prices and tenancy agreements, conditional on the included controls.
  • Findingown data
    § 6.1 Alternative specifications and samples · p. 21

    The results remain largely unaltered across the alternative specifications and samples, with one exception.

    “The results remain largely unaltered across the alternative specifications and samples, with one exception.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Findingown data
    § 5.2 Evidence from weekly data · p. 15

    In the two weeks prior to rent regulation, the number of agreements signed increased by 17%.

    “As for anticipation effects, the results indicate that in the two weeks prior to rent regulation, the number of agreements signed increased by 17%.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, regulated and non-regulated municipalities would have followed parallel trends in rental prices and tenancy agreements, conditional on the included controls.
  • May combine two claims. 22
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 10
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 15

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 6.2 The potentially confounding effects of Covid-19 · p. 21

    In Table A7, the results for the number of tenancy agreements become positive (0.049) and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.

    “First, the results for the number of tenancy agreements become positive (0.049) and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 6.1 Alternative specifications and samples · p. 19

    Excluding control municipalities that are direct neighbors of regulated municipalities, the coefficient for rents becomes more negative (0.058 instead of -0.045), while the coefficient for tenancy agreements remains insignificant.

    “The coefficient for rents becomes more negative (0.058 instead of -0.045 in the baseline), while the coefficient for tenancy agreements remains insignificant.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, regulated and non-regulated municipalities would have followed parallel trends in rental prices and tenancy agreements, conditional on the included controls.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 29

    In municipalities with fewer than 500 vacation homes, rent control is associated with a 5.0% increase in average sales prices during the anticipation period (coefficient 0.050, SE 0.028, p<0.1).

    “0.050*”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 31

    In the specification with municipality size and Covid-19 interactions, rent control is associated with an 18.1% increase in tenancy agreements during the anticipation period (coefficient 0.181, SE 0.036, p<0.01).

    “0.181***”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 28

    In the specification with municipality size and Covid-19 interactions, rent control is associated with an 8.8% increase in the number of sales per 1000 inhabitants during the anticipation period (coefficient 0.088, SE 0.038, p<0.05).

    “0.088**”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 32

    In the specification controlling for migration, rent control is associated with a 14.2% increase in tenancy agreements during the anticipation period (coefficient 0.142, SE 0.029, p<0.01).

    “0.142***”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 6.1 Alternative specifications and samples · p. 18

    With municipality-specific linear time trends, the price effect is slightly larger (-0.051 vs -0.045) and the effect on signed agreements becomes more negative but remains statistically insignificant (-0.028 vs -0.003).

    “The results obtained are similar to those of the baseline specification (column 3 in Table 2 reproduced here in column 1), although the price effect is slightly larger (-0.051 vs. -0.045) and the effect on the number of signed agreements becomes more negative, but still is statistically insignificant (-0.028 vs -0.003).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, regulated and non-regulated municipalities would have followed parallel trends in rental prices and tenancy agreements, conditional on the included controls.

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 30

    In the specification with distance to nearest province capital and Covid-19 interactions, rent control is associated with a 6.2% decrease in the number of sales per 1000 inhabitants after implementation (coefficient -0.062, SE 0.030, p<0.05).

    “-0.062**”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 6.2 The potentially confounding effects of Covid-19 · p. 21

    In Table A7, most results remain largely unchanged, with two exceptions.

    “Although most results remain largely unchanged, there are two exceptions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 31

    In the specification controlling for migration, rent control is associated with an 8.3% increase in ended agreements during the anticipation period (coefficient 0.083, SE 0.040, p<0.05).

    “0.083**”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 31

    In the specification with municipality size and Covid-19 interactions, rent control is associated with a 5.5% decrease in average rents after implementation (coefficient -0.055, SE 0.009, p<0.01).

    “-0.055***”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 29

    In the specification controlling for migration, rent control is associated with a 6.6% decrease in the number of sales per 1000 inhabitants after implementation (coefficient -0.066, SE 0.031, p<0.05).

    “-0.066**”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 3 Data · p. 9

    The average rent slightly decreased in regulated municipalities while it increased in non-regulated municipalities between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the fourth quarter of 2021.

    “We note that the average rent slightly decreases in regulated municipalities, while it increases in non-regulated ones.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 30

    In the specification with distance to nearest province capital and Covid-19 interactions, rent control is associated with a 7.4% increase in ended agreements during the anticipation period (coefficient 0.074, SE 0.038, p<0.1).

    “0.074*”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 6.2 The potentially confounding effects of Covid-19 · p. 21

    In Table A7, the negative result for the number of sales becomes smaller in absolute value and statistically insignificant.

    “Second, the negative result for the number of sales (column 6 in Table 3) becomes smaller in absolute value and becomes statistically insignificant.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 7 Concluding remarks · p. 23

    There is no evidence that the regulation reduced the number of tenancy agreements, the number of ended agreements, or the stock of rental units.

    “In contrast, we do not find evidence that the regulation reduced the number of tenancy agreements, the number of ended agreements, not the stock of rental units.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 30

    In the specification with distance to nearest province capital and Covid-19 interactions, rent control is associated with a 3.8% decrease in average rents after implementation (coefficient -0.038, SE 0.006, p<0.01).

    “-0.038*** (0.006)”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 30

    In the specification with distance to nearest province capital and Covid-19 interactions, rent control is associated with a 12.2% increase in tenancy agreements during the anticipation period (coefficient 0.122, SE 0.028, p<0.01).

    “0.122***”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 3 Data · p. 9

    Regulated municipalities are larger and closer to the nearest CBD than non-regulated municipalities.

    “We also observe that regulated municipalities are larger and closer to the nearest CBD than non-regulated municipalities.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 31

    In the specification with municipality size and Covid-19 interactions, rent control is associated with a 4.9% increase in tenancy agreements after implementation (coefficient 0.049, SE 0.029, p<0.1).

    “0.049*”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 5.3 Results on other housing market outcomes · p. 17

    The rent control policy did not reduce the number of agreements signed for either previously rented or new units.

    “The results in columns 3 and 4 indicate that the policy did not reduce the number of agreements signed for any of the two groups of units considered.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, regulated and non-regulated municipalities would have followed parallel trends in rental prices and tenancy agreements, conditional on the included controls.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Findingnone given
    § 2 The rent control system in Catalonia · p. 6

    Between 2016 and 2019, rents increased by 30% in the municipalities that would soon be treated.

    “Between 2016 and 2019, right before the rent control regulation, rents increased by 30% in those soon-to-be-treated municipalities.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 31

    In the specification with municipality size and Covid-19 interactions, rent control is associated with a 9.6% increase in ended agreements during the anticipation period (coefficient 0.096, SE 0.041, p<0.05).

    “0.096**”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.
    • Rests on an assumption: The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 29

    Across alternative specifications and samples, rent control has no statistically significant effect on average sales prices after implementation.

    “RentControl × Post | 0.015 (0.013) | -0.006 (0.018) | 0.014 (0.013) | 0.003 (0.013) | -0.007 (0.016) | 0.018 (0.014) | 0.013 (0.013) | 0.020 (”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.

  • May combine two claims.

    Findingown data
    § 1 Introduction · p. 3

    The regulation did not affect the number of ended agreements or the active stock of rented units.

    “We further explore the supply effects of rent control by looking at the number of ended agreements and at the stock of rented units. Both outcomes seem unaffected by the rent control, confirming that the number of rented units did not shrink as a consequence of the rent regulation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • The quote only partly states this claim.

    Findingown data
    § 8 Appendix · p. 29

    Across alternative specifications and samples, rent control is associated with a decrease in the number of sales per 1000 inhabitants after implementation.

    “RentControl × Post | -0.071** (0.028) | -0.053 (0.033) 0.052 | -0.066** (0.029) | -0.028 (0.030) 0.050 | -0.011 (0.036) 0.040”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 5.1 Baseline results · p. 13

    The median income for rental households in the NUTS1 region that comprises Catalonia and Valencia is €24,666.

    “The median income for rental households in the NUTS1 region that comprises Catalonia and Valencia is e 24,666.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites EU-SILC for 2019

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § Abstract · p. 2

    Rent control policies can effectively reduce rental prices without necessarily shrinking the rental market.

    “Our results suggest that rent control policies can effectively reduce rental prices without necessarily shrinking the rental market.”
    • Also stated in: § 1 Introduction · p. 5 · hedged
      “We show that such a policy does not necessarily reduce the size of the rental market, at least in the short run.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § 1 Introduction · p. 5

    Rent control policies can be enforced and, thus, effective in reducing rent growth in cities.

    “Our results indicate that rent control policies can be enforced and, thus, effective in reducing rent growth in cities.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § 4.1 Graphical evidence · p. 11

    The gap in tenancy agreements in the third quarter of 2020 is particularly large and is consistent with an anticipation effect to avoid the regulation.

    “The gap in the third quarter of 2020 is particularly large and is consistent with an anticipation effect to avoid the regulation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 6.2 The potentially confounding effects of Covid-19 · p. 21

    Working from home increases the demand for larger dwellings and dwellings with outdoor space.

    “if WFH increases the demand for larger dwellings and dwellings with outdoor space (Delventhal et al., 2021).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Delventhal et al., 2021 source

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 6.3 The end of rent control · p. 22

    The effects estimated are causal and are not driven by differential trends or asymmetric shocks between regulated and non-regulated municipalities.

    “this exercise also provides very strong evidence that the effects that we estimate are causal and are not driven by differential trends or asymmetric shocks between regulated and non-regulated municipalities.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 1 Introduction · p. 5

    The Catalan rent control policy's enforcement is likely high compared to the German regulation because the Catalan regulation includes fines for noncompliance and awareness of the regulation should be high since ads and tenancy agreements must include the applicable rent cap.

    “Another characteristic of the rent control policy in Catalonia is that its enforcement is likely to be high compared to the German regulation. This is because the Catalan regulation includes fines for noncompliance (contrary to the German case), and awareness of the regulation should be high since ads and tenancy agreements must include the applicable rent cap.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given
    § 5.3 Results on other housing market outcomes · p. 17

    Previously rented units are subject to both a nominal cap and the previous rent, while newly rented units are only subject to the nominal cap.

    “This conforms to expectations, since previously rented units are subject to both a nominal cap and the previous rent, while newly rented units are only subject to the nominal cap.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § 5.1 Baseline results · p. 13

    The average household annual income in Catalonia is €33,321.

    “the average household annual income in Catalonia is e 33,321 9 .”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Idescat for 2019

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 2 The rent control system in Catalonia · p. 7

    The time window in which there might be anticipation effects is very short because the rent control legislation followed a rapid legislative procedure and the initiative was not salient until the first week of September.

    “The time window in which there might be anticipation effects is very short because the rent control legislation followed a rapid legislative procedure and the initiative was not salient until the first week of September”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data
    § 5.1 Baseline results · p. 12

    The inclusion of variables reflecting local labor market dynamics or allowing for anticipation effects does not affect the estimates of interest.

    “The inclusion of variables reflecting the local labor market dynamics (column 2) or allowing for anticipation effects (column 3) does not affect our estimates of interest.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Study design and conductown data
    § 1 Introduction · p. 3

    The register data allow more accurate measurement of rent prices and an in-depth analysis of rental market dynamics compared to posted rental data used in earlier studies.

    “In contrast to posted rental data used in earlier studies, the register data allow us to more accurately measure rent prices and perform an in-depth analysis of the rental market dynamics after a rent control regulation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § 5.3 Results on other housing market outcomes · p. 16

    The policy did not encourage tenants to move to other units as a response to the regulation, suggesting that the policy did not significantly affect turnover.

    “This suggests that the policy did not encourage tenants to move to other units as a response to the regulation, suggesting that the policy did not significantly affect turnover.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: In the absence of rent control, regulated and non-regulated municipalities would have followed parallel trends in rental prices and tenancy agreements, conditional on the included controls.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 1 Introduction · p. 5

    A rent control regulation that virtually covers the entire rental market might limit supply responses caused by rent control, since landlords cannot displace units to non-regulated market segments by renovating units or converting units to condos.

    “This feature of the policy might limit the supply responses caused by rent control, since landlords cannot displace units to non-regulated market segments by renovating units or converting units to condos.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § 6.2 The potentially confounding effects of Covid-19 · p. 21

    Working from home significantly reduces commuting costs, making moving to the suburbs more attractive.

    “Commuting costs are significantly reduced with WFH, which makes moving to the suburbs more attractive (Delventhal et al., 2021).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Delventhal et al., 2021 source
41 of 41

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The rent control policy virtually covered the entire rental market.

    “The policy virtually covered all the rental market and forced ads and tenancy agreements to specify the applicable rent cap to ensure enforcement.”
    “The policy covered the entire rental market virtually, with higher nominal caps for units built during the last five years.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In the absence of rent control, regulated and non-regulated municipalities would have followed parallel trends in rental market outcomes.

    “This allows us to compare two groups with similar rental market pre-trends.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The rent control policy ended in March 2022.

    “The policy ended in March 2022, when it was declared unconstitutional.”
    “The system was in place until March 2022 when it was declared unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In the absence of rent control, regulated and non-regulated municipalities would have followed parallel trends in rental prices and tenancy agreements, conditional on the included controls.

    “the hypothesis that regulated and non-regulated municipalities show parallel trends prior to the adoption of the policy seems to hold”
    “there is no evidence of pre-trends in Panel (b), implying that before the rent control system was adopted, the two groups of municipalities evolved similarly regarding the number of tenancy agreements signed per 1000 inhabitants.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The Covid-19 shock did not differentially affect regulated and non-regulated municipalities in ways not captured by the included labor-market controls and fixed effects.

    “Even if we control for quarter fixed effects, the impacts of Covid-19 on housing markets could be different across municipalities.”
    “Therefore, the vector X m,t includes variables reflecting the dynamics of local labor markets.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The main analysis assumes no spillover effects from regulated to non-regulated municipalities.

    “One caveat of our approach is that non-regulated municipalities in our control group might also be affected by the policy.”
    “In both cases, we expect spillover effects to be larger in control municipalities that are direct neighbors of rent-controlled municipalities.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The empirical literature on the effects of rent control is scarce.

    “Despite being such a salient policy, the empirical literature on its effects is scarce.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    In the absence of rent control, treated and control municipalities would have followed parallel trends.

    “Estimates of equation 1.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The included controls and Covid-19 interactions adequately account for confounding factors, including pandemic-related economic changes.

    “Controls include the number of unemployed people, the number of Covid-19 furloughs and the number of new employment contracts.”
9 of 9

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Wrong sign stated for the estimate excluding neighbors

    Minor

    The text calls the estimate 0.058 and says it is more negative than −0.045, but Table 5 reports −0.058 for that specification.

1 of 1

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Jofre-Monseny, J., Martínez-Mazza, R., & Segú, M.
Affiliations
  • Uppsala University (SE)
  • CY Cergy Paris Université (FR)
Corresponding author
Segú, Mariona
ORCID
Venue
Regional Science and Urban Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2023-07
Volume
101
Pages
103916
ISSN
0166-0462 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2023.103916
OpenAlex
W4379879688
Semantic Scholar
3b958d4a41a21e742870651a7951ceb239353c89
Cited by
31
References
16
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 3
FWCI
6.30
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Regional Science and Urban Economics (acceptedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Dipòsit Digital de la Universitat de Barcelona (Universitat de Barcelona) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Funders
Uppsala Universitet
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Housing Market and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Urban, Neighborhood, and Segregation Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism
Keywords
rent control, housing affordability, rental prices, lease agreements, rent caps, Catalonia

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-11-02.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-11-02.

Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review