Cited by 213Chaos-based Image/Signal EncryptionCryptographic Implementations and SecurityComputer Science and Engineering

Optimal quantitative cryptanalysis of permutation-only multimedia ciphers against plaintext attacks

Open access
Li, Chengqing, Lo, Kwok-Tung·2011·Signal Processing

Abstract

In [Pattern Recognition Letters, in press, doi:10.1016/j.patrec.2009.11.008], an image scrambling encryption algorithm of pixel bit based on chaos map was proposed. Considering the algorithm as a typical binary image scrambling/permutation algorithm exerting on plaintext of size M � (8N), this paper proposes a novel optimal method to break it with some known/chosen-plaintexts. The spatial complexity and computational complexity of the attack are only O(32 � MN) and O(16 � n0 � MN) respectively, where n0 is the number of known/chosen-plaintexts used. The method can be easily

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper gives an optimal known/chosen-plaintext cryptanalysis of a chaos-based pixel-bit image permutation cipher and extends it to any permutation-only multimedia cipher. It recovers the equivalent permutation matrix with low spatial and computational complexity and reports experimental recovery on 256×256 images.

Key findings

  • For the binary image permutation algorithm on plaintext size \(M \times (8N)\), the attack needs only \(O(32 \cdot MN)\) spatial complexity and \(O(16 \cdot n_0 \cdot MN)\) computational complexity, where \(n_0\) is the number of known/chosen plaintexts.
  • For any permutation-only scheme on size \(M \times N\) with \(L\) value levels, the attack achieves \(O(MN)\) spatial complexity and \(O(\lceil \log_L(MN)\rceil \cdot MN)\) computational complexity.
  • For 256×256 images, the known-plaintext threshold becomes \(n_0 > \lceil \log_2(2^{19}-1)\rceil = 19\); with 20 known plain-images, the recovered “Peppers” image had \(23509/65536 \approx 35.8\%\) correct pixels but most visual information recovered, and performance was good when \(n_0 \ge 20\).
  • Exact chosen-plaintext recovery requires \(n_c = \lceil \log_2(8MN)\rceil = 3 + \lceil \log_2(MN)\rceil\) chosen plain-images; the paper also notes weaknesses including weak Logistic-map randomness, failure on all-zero/all-255 images, plaintext insensitivity, equivalent subkeys \(x_0\) and \(1-x_0\), unchanged bit histogram, and low efficiency.

Methods

  • The cipher is represented as an \(M \times (8N)\) permutation matrix \(W\); the attack constructs a binary tree from known/chosen plaintext–ciphertext pairs to recover \(W\), then extends this to a multi-branch tree for general \(L\)-level permutation-only schemes.
  • Experiments use randomly selected natural images of size 256×256, with an illustrated key \((x_0,\mu,m,n,T)=(0.2009,3.98,20,51,4)\) and recovered “Peppers” images using estimates \(W_{20}\) and \(W_{25}\), plus a \(3\times3\) median filter.
  • The analysis derives recovery thresholds under a uniform independent-bit assumption and reports spatial/computational complexity for the binary and general cases.

Limitations

  • The paper states no explicit limitations section.
  • Evident from the text: the known-plaintext threshold analysis assumes each bit is uniformly distributed over \(\{0,1\}\) and independent; the authors note natural-image redundancy causes flat performance slopes for \(n_0 \ge 25\) and has two opposite influences on breaking.
  • Evident from the text: experimental validation is mainly on 256×256 natural images with one illustrated secret key, and the attack inherently requires known or chosen plaintext–ciphertext pairs.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.sigpro.2010.09.014

Cites

28 of 28 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 10 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Findingreasoning
    § Abstract · p. 1

    For the extended attack on any permutation-only scheme with plaintext size M × N and L value levels, the computational complexity is O(⌈log_L(MN)⌉ · MN).

    “The corresponding spatial complexity and computational complexity are only O ( MN ) and O ( ⌈ log L ( MN ) ⌉ · MN ) respectively.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The attacker can obtain some known or chosen plaintexts together with their corresponding ciphertexts encrypted under the same secret key.
  • Findingown data
    § 3.1. Known-plaintext attack · p. 4

    With 20 known plain-images, the recovered Peppers image contains most visual information despite only 23509/65536 ≈ 35.8% of plain pixels being correct.

    “It is found that most visual information contained in the original plain-image has been recovered in Fig. 2c), although only 23509 / 65536 ≈ 35 . 8% of plain pixels are correct in value.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingreasoning
    § 4. Known/chosen-plaintext attack on any permutation-only multimedia encryption schemes · p. 9

    The spatial complexity of the proposed attack is O(MN).

    “spatial complexity and computational complexity of the attack are O ( MN ) and O ( n 0 · MN ), respectively.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Findingreasoning
    § Abstract · p. 1

    For the extended attack on any permutation-only scheme with plaintext size M × N and L value levels, the spatial complexity is O(MN).

    “The corresponding spatial complexity and computational complexity are only O ( MN ) and O ( ⌈ log L ( MN ) ⌉ · MN ) respectively.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: The attacker can obtain some known or chosen plaintexts together with their corresponding ciphertexts encrypted under the same secret key.
  • Findingown data
    § 3.1. Known-plaintext attack · p. 5

    Breaking performance is good when n0 ≥ 20.

    “One can see that the breaking performance is good when n 0 ≥ 20.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 7
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 2
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationown data
    § 3.2. Chosen-plaintext attack · p. 7

    The image permutation algorithm fails to encrypt images of fixed value zero or 255 because all elements of the intermediate matrix B* are the same, making all encryption procedures do nothing.

    “Fail to encrypt images of fixed value zero or 255”
    • Also stated in: § 3.2. Chosen-plaintext attack · p. 7 · plain
      “For both the two images, all elements of the corresponding intermediate matrix B ∗ are the same, which make all the encryption procedures do nothing.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 3.2. Chosen-plaintext attack · p. 7

    The image permutation algorithm is insensitive to changes of plaintext and does not consider the property that changing any single plaintext bit should change every ciphertext bit with probability one half.

    “Insensitivity with respect to changes of plaintext”
    • Also stated in: § 3.2. Chosen-plaintext attack · p. 8 · plain
      “Unfortunately, the image permutation algorithm under study does not consider this property at all.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 3.2. Chosen-plaintext attack · p. 8

    Although the algorithm changes the plain-byte histogram, it leaves the plain-bit histogram unchanged, so the cipher-image still reveals some plain-image information.

    “Although the histogram on plain-byte is changed by the image permutation algorithm under study, the one on plain-bit keep unchanged, which make the cipher-image still reveal some information of the plain-image.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § 3.1. Known-plaintext attack · p. 3

    A general algorithm for obtaining the permutation matrix by comparing the values of elements of some plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts was proposed in [20].

    “Since that the secret permutation does not change the values of the permuted elements, a general algorithm was proposed in [20] for obtaining the permutation matrix by comparing the values of the elements of some plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [20] Li, 2008, A general quantitative cryptanalysis of permutation-only multimedia ciphers against plaintext attacks, Signal Processing: Image Communication source
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 4. Known/chosen-plaintext attack on any permutation-only multimedia encryption schemes · p. 9

    Substituting n0 with ⌈log_L(MN)⌉, the attack complexity becomes O(⌈log_L(MN)⌉·MN), which is much lower than the O(⌈log_L(MN)⌉·MN2) estimated in [20].

    “Substitute n 0 with ⌈ log L ( MN ) ⌉ , the complexity becomes O ( ⌈ log L ( MN ) ⌉· MN ), which is lower much than O ( ⌈ log L ( MN ) ⌉ · MN 2 ), the whole attack complexity estimated in [20].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [20] Li, 2008, A general quantitative cryptanalysis of permutation-only multimedia ciphers against plaintext attacks, Signal Processing: Image Communication source
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 3.1. Known-plaintext attack · p. 6

    The proposed known-plaintext attack has spatial complexity O(32·MN) and computational complexity O(16·n0·MN).

    “Obviously, the spatial complexity and the computational complexity of the proposed knownplaintext attack are only O (32 · MN ) and O (16 · n 0 · MN ), respectively.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § 3.1. Known-plaintext attack · p. 5

    The recovery of most visual information despite low pixel correctness is due to strong redundancy in natural images, which makes two pixel values close with probability larger than average and many incorrectly recovered pixels close to their true values.

    “due to strong redundancy in natural images, two pixel values are close to each other with a probability larger than the average one, hence many incorrectly recovered pixels are close to their true values with a probability larger than the average one also.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § 3.2. Chosen-plaintext attack · p. 8

    The generation method of permutation matrices T_M and T_N makes the computational complexity of the image permutation algorithm O(M·(8N)^2), which is much larger than that of DES.

    “The generation method of permutation matrixes T M and T N make the computational complexity of the image permutation algorithm under study is O ( M · (8 N ) 2 ), which is even much larger than that of DES.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given
    § 3.1. Known-plaintext attack · p. 3

    A secret permutation does not change the values of the permuted elements.

    “Since that the secret permutation does not change the values of the permuted elements, a general algorithm was proposed in [20] for obtaining the permutation matrix by comparing the values of the elements of some plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
9 of 9
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The attacker can obtain some known or chosen plaintexts together with their corresponding ciphertexts encrypted under the same secret key.

    “The known-plaintext attack is an attack model for cryptanalysis where the attacker has some samples of both the plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext and make use of them to reveal secret information, such as secret keys and/or its equivalent ones.”
    “this paper proposes a novel optimal method to break it with some known/chosen-plaintexts.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Each element in B is uniformly distributed over {0,1}.

    “To simplify the analyses, we assume that each element in B distributes uniformly over { 0 , 1 } , and any two elements are independent of each other.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Any two elements in B are independent of each other.

    “To simplify the analyses, we assume that each element in B distributes uniformly over { 0 , 1 } , and any two elements are independent of each other.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Decryption is acceptable when every bit is correctly determined with probability greater than 0.5.

    “Generally speaking, when every bit is determined correctly with a probability larger than a half, namely p b > 0 . 5, the decryption will be acceptable.”
4 of 4

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Binary-tree search tests the wrong component

    Minor

    The node definition places a set in the third component and its cardinality in the fourth. The later search tests whether the third item is greater than one, although that test applies to the cardinality.

  • Figure 4b identifies the wrong source image

    Minor

    The text says Figure 4b is the median-filtered result of Figure 2d, but the Figure 4 caption says it is the result of Figure 2b.

  • Threshold excludes a value satisfying its stated criterion

    Minor

    For the stated 256 × 256 case, 8MN − 1 = 219 − 1. At n0 = 19, the paper's formula gives p_b = 1/(1 + (219 − 1)/219) > 0.5, yet its reported inequality requires n0 > 19.

3 of 3

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Authors
Li, C., & Lo, K.-T.
Affiliations
Hong Kong Polytechnic University (HK)
Corresponding author
Li, Chengqing
Venue
Signal Processing
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2011-04
Volume
91
Issue
4
Pages
949-954
ISSN
0165-1684 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4252343056
Cited by
213
References
26
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 20 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 21 · 2017: 27 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 8
FWCI
7.72
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Signal Processing (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • PolyU Institutional Research Archive (Hong Kong Polytechnic University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Computer Science and Engineering
Keywords
chaotic maps, cryptanalysis, known-plaintext attack, chosen-plaintext attack, attack complexity, multimedia encryption

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