Individual Representation in a Community of Knowledge
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
An individual's knowledge is collective in at least two senses: it often comes from other people's testimony, and its deployment in reasoning and action requires accuracy underwritten by other people's knowledge. What must one know to participate in a collective knowledge system? Here, we marshal evidence that individuals retain detailed causal information for a few domains and coarse causal models embedding markers indicating that these details are available elsewhere (others' heads or the physical world) for most domains. This framework yields further questions about metacognition, source credibility, and individual computation that are theoretically and practically important. Belief polarization depends on the web of epistemic dependence and is greatest for those who know the least, plausibly due to extreme conflation of others' knowledge with one's own.
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Artificial intelligence and illusions of understanding in scientific research
Messeri, L., & Crockett, M. J. (2024) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-024-07146-0 · Cited by 707
False polarization: Cognitive mechanisms and potential solutions
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Concepts for which we need others more: the case of abstract concepts
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Inducing feelings of ignorance makes people more receptive to expert (economist) opinion
Meyers, E. A., Turpin, M. H., Białek, M., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2020) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500008135 · Cited by 23
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rabb, N., Fernbach, P. M., & Sloman, S. A.
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019-10
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 891-902
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2971284148
- Cited by
- 104
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 199.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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