Finessing the bored monkey problem
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Neuroimaging and electrophysiology findings that the contents of conscious perceptual experience can be decoded from PFC activity might be confounded by postperceptual cognitive processes not necessary for consciousness.
“Neuroimaging and electrophysiology studies have revealed that the contents of conscious perceptual experience can be successfully decoded from PFC activity, but these findings might be confounded by postperceptual cognitive processes, such as thinking, reasoning, and decision-making, that are not necessary for consciousness.”
From Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain (2021) · cites this paper as Block, 2020
In “Finessing the Bored Monkey Problem” (page not specified), Block reports that conscious perceptual contents were decoded from monkey PFC microelectrode recordings and argues that thoughts about the stimuli could produce PFC differences unrelated to consciousness. The copy does not report successful decoding from neuroimaging studies; it mentions fMRI only as a method that could detect such differences. (LLM, conf=0.85)
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Cites
Is the frontal lobe involved in conscious perception?
Safavi, S., Kapoor, V., Logothetis, N. K., & Panagiotaropoulos, T. I. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01063 · Cited by 351 · see citing works
Panagiotaropoulos, T. I., Deco, G., Kapoor, V., & Logothetis, N. K. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.013 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
What is wrong with the no-report paradigm and how to fix it
Block, N. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.10.001 · Cited by 176 · cited 2× · see citing works
“As I noted in my recent Trends in Cognitive Sciences article [5], such results cannot be taken to support cognitive theories of consciousness because of the ‘bored monkey problem’: the idea that subjects whose only task is fixating a dot may have thoughts about the noticeably different stimuli, causing prefrontal diff…”
BackgroundResultSelf-citationNegligible fronto-parietal BOLD activity accompanying unreportable switches in bistable perception
Brascamp, J. W., Blake, R., & Knapen, T. H. J. (2015) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.4130 · Cited by 161 · see citing works
The Fundamental Problem with No-Cognition Paradigms
Phillips, I. B., & Morales, J. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.11.010 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Kapoor, K., Dwarakanath, A., Safavi, S., Werner, J., Panagiotaropoulos, T. I., & Logothetis, N. K. (2019) · Cited by 22 · see citing works
(2018) · Cited by 21 · see citing works
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The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367 · see citing works
Self-citationThe ConTraSt database for analysing and comparing empirical studies of consciousness theories
Yaron, I., Melloni, L., Pitts, M., & Mudrik, L. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01284-5 · Cited by 147 · see citing works
Raccah, O., Block, N., & Fox, K. C. R. (2021) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1141-20.2020 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
Self-citationHesse, J. K., & Tsao, D. Y. (2020) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.58360 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
- Authors
- Block, N.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Block, Ned
- ORCID
- Block, Ned
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2020-03
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 167-168
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3001760390
- Cited by
- 40
- References
- 7
- Citations by year
- 2025: 6 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 4
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Locations
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- no-report paradigm, binocular rivalry, flash suppression, prefrontal cortex, conscious perception, neuronal discharge, perceptual transitions
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Haplorhini, Humans
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