All Thinking is ‘Wishful’ Thinking
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
People often seek new information and eagerly update their beliefs. Other times they avoid information or resist revising their beliefs. What explains those different reactions? Answers to this question often frame information processing as a competition between cognition and motivation. Here, we dissolve this dichotomy by bringing together two theoretical frameworks: epistemic motivation and active inference. Despite evolving from different intellectual traditions, both frameworks attest to the indispensability of motivational considerations to the epistemic process. The imperatives that guide model construction under the epistemic motivation framework can be mapped onto key constructs in active inference. Drawing these connections offers a way of articulating social psychological constructs in terms of Bayesian computations and provides a generative testing ground for future work.
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Cites
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Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs
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Canonical Microcircuits for Predictive Coding
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Self-citationThe free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain?
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Self-citationLess than you think: Prevalence and predictors of fake news dissemination on Facebook
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Bayesian surprise attracts human attention
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Cited by
Theory Is All You Need: AI, Human Cognition, and Causal Reasoning
(2024) · doi:10.1287/stsc.2024.0189 · Cited by 151
Predictive processing in cognitive robotics: A review
Ciria, A., Schillaci, G., Pezzulo, G., Hafner, V. V., & Lara, B. (2021) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01383 · Cited by 51
“The expected action consequences include the expected inaccuracy or ambiguity, and the expected complexity or risk, which are combined into the expected free energy (Kruglanski et al., 2020).”
BackgroundA motivational systems approach to investigating opinions on climate change
Molden, D. C., Bayes, R., & Druckman, J. N. (2022) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546783.2021.1982003 · Cited by 12
“…distinction between non-directional and directional goals has also been described by Kruglanski and colleagues in terms of needs for non-specific closure versus needs for specific closure, respectively (see e.g., Kruglanski, 1999; Kruglanski et al., 2020; Kruglanski, Jasko, & Friston, 2020).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Kruglanski, A. W., Jasko, K., & Friston, K.
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2020-06
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 413-424
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3015786209
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 1.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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