Estimating causal strength: the role of structural knowledge and processing effort
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The strength of causal relations typically must be inferred on the basis of statistical relations between observable events. This article focuses on the problem that there are multiple ways of extracting statistical information from a set of events. In causal structures involving a potential cause, an effect and a third related event, the assumed causal role of this third event crucially determines whether it is appropriate to control for this event when making causal assessments between the potential cause and the effect. Three experiments show that prior assumptions about the causal roles of the learning events affect the way contingencies are assessed with otherwise identical learning input. However, prior assumptions about causal roles is only one factor influencing contingency estimation. The experiments also demonstrate that processing effort affects the way statistical information is processed. These findings provide further evidence for the interaction between bottom-up and top-down influences in the acquisition of causal knowledge. They show that, apart from covariation information or knowledge about mechanisms, abstract assumptions about causal structures also may affect the learning process.
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Cites
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Cited by
A Theory of Causal Learning in Children: Causal Maps and Bayes Nets.
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Causal Cognition in Human and Nonhuman Animals: A Comparative, Critical Review
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The Advantage of Timely Intervention.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Waldmann, M. R., & Hagmayer, Y.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-11
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 27-58
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2161047024
- Cited by
- 121
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 5.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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