The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The role of risk in executive compensation
Abstract
The present study was designed to investigate the role of risk in executive compensation. We argue that compensation arrangements may be used to mitigate agency problems by encouraging risk taking behavior and providing incentives for optimizing long-term performance. We examine total compensation, compensation risk, and compensation time horizon. Consistent with our theory, the evidence indicates that these dimensions vary with the financial and strategic context of the firm and with the risk-taking propensity of the CEO.
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*
Sharpe, W. F. (1964) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02865.x · Cited by 19,441
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338
Hsiao, C. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139839327 · Cited by 7,869
SECURITY PRICES, RISK, AND MAXIMAL GAINS FROM DIVERSIFICATION*
Lintner, J. (1965) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02930.x · Cited by 2,452
Reconceptualizing the Determinants of Risk Behavior
Sitkin, S. B., & Pablo, A. L. (1992) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258646 · Cited by 2,057
Cited by
A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking
Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/259103 · Cited by 1,591
How Much Does Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of CEO Pay Studies
Tosi, H. L., Werner, S., Katz, J. P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920630002600207 · Cited by 979
HOW MUCH DOES THE CEO MATTER? THE ROLE OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION IN THE SETTING OF CEO COMPENSATION.
Finkelstein, S., & Boyd, B. K. (1998) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/257101 · Cited by 799
THE DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN FAMILY-CONTROLLED PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Larraza-Kintana, M., & Makri, M. (2003) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/30040616 · Cited by 770
Perceptions of Benevolence and the Design of Agency Contracts: CEO-TMT Relationships in Family Firms
Cruz, C. C., Gómez-Mejia, L. R., & Becerra, M. (2010) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2010.48036975 · Cited by 511
Metadata
- Authors
- Gray, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Management
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1997
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 517-540
- ISSN
- 0149-2063 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1982024309
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 20.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.