The DOI matches its Crossref record; 125 of the 125 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Perceptions of Benevolence and the Design of Agency Contracts: CEO-TMT Relationships in Family Firms
Abstract
In this study, we view the contracts of top managers from an integrated agency theory-trust perspective, arguing that two conditions reflecting CEO risk bearing, top management team (TMT) behavioral uncertainty and CEO vulnerability, are negatively related to a CEO's perceptions of TMT benevolence toward him-/herself, which in turn influence the protective features of TMT contracts. Model tests on data from 122 family-owned firms in Spain support our hypotheses overall. Agency theory may be enhanced by accounting for a CEO's perceptions (as principal) of TMT benevolence and for the effect of those perceptions on contracts with TMT members (as agents).
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Cites
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Cited by
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2012) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1177/0894486511435355 · Cited by 2,724
Self-citationThe Bind that Ties: Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms
Gómez‐Mejía, L. R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P., & Castro, J. O. D. (2011) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2011.593320 · Cited by 2,230
Self-citationDiversification Decisions in Family‐Controlled Firms
Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Kintana, M. L. (2010) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00889.x · Cited by 1,236
The dark side of buyer–supplier relationships: A social capital perspective⋆
Villena, V. H., Revilla, E., & Choi, T. Y. (2011) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2010.09.001 · Cited by 1,018
Cao, Z., & Lumineau, F. (2015) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2014.09.009 · Cited by 937
Metadata
- Authors
- Cruz, C. C., Gómez-Mejia, L. R., & Becerra, M.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2010-02
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 69-89
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2105276238
- Cited by
- 511
- References
- 125
- FWCI
- 52.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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