The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
THE DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN FAMILY-CONTROLLED PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.
Abstract
Family-member CEOs of family-controlled firms receive lower total income than outsider CEOs, increasingly so as family ownership concentration increases. At the same time, their pay tends to be mor...
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Citations
Cites
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
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Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.12.2.99.10114 · Cited by 2,332
Financial Theory and Corporate Policy.
Paddock, J., Copeland, T. E., & Weston, J. F. (1980) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2327506 · Cited by 1,698
THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES IN AGENCY CONTRACTS.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. (2001) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069338 · Cited by 1,305
Self-citationThe dynamics of family controlled firms: The good and the bad news
Kets de Vries, M. F. R. (1993) · Organizational Dynamics · doi:10.1016/0090-2616(93)90071-8 · Cited by 996
Owner as Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family Firm
James, H. S. (1999) · International Journal of the Economics of Business · doi:10.1080/13571519984304 · Cited by 961
An Empirical Examination of Ownership Structure in Family and Professionally Managed Firms
Daily, C. M., & Dollinger, M. J. (1992) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1111/j.1741-6248.1992.00117.x · Cited by 804
Cited by
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2012) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1177/0894486511435355 · Cited by 2,724
Self-citationFamily Involvement, Family Influence, and Family–Centered Non–Economic Goals in Small Firms
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., Pearson, A. W., & Barnett, T. (2012) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00407.x · Cited by 1,248
Zellweger, T. M., Kellermanns, F. W., Chrisman, J. J., & Chua, J. H. (2012) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1110.0665 · Cited by 832
Ou, A. Y., Tsui, A. S., Kinicki, A. J., Waldman, D. A., Xiao, Z., & Song, L. J. (2014) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.1177/0001839213520131 · Cited by 561
The mystery of zero-leverage firms
Strebulaev, I. A., & Yang, B. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.001 · Cited by 538
Metadata
- Authors
- Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Larraza-Kintana, M., & Makri, M.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2003-04-01
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 226-237
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2017966498
- Cited by
- 770
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 18.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: THE DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN FAMILY-CONTROLLED PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/30040616
- The paper
- Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Larraza-Kintana, M., & Makri, M. (2003). THE DETERMINANTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN FAMILY-CONTROLLED PUBLIC CORPORATIONS. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/30040616
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
