The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Feature centrality and conceptual coherence
Open accessAbstract
Conceptual features differ in how mentally tranformable they are.A robin that does not eat is harder to imagine than a robin that does not chirp.We argue that features are immutable to the extent that they are central in a network of dependency relations.The immutability of a feature reflects how much the internal structure of a concept depends on that feature; i .e., how much the feature contributes to the concept's coherence.Complementarily, mutability reflects the aspects in which a concept is flexible.We show that features can be reliably ordered according to their mutability using tasks that require people to conceive of objects missing a feature, and that mutability (conceptual centrality) can be distinguished from category centrality and from diagnosticity and salience.We test a model of mutability based on asymmetric, unlabeled, pairwise dependency relations.With no free parameters, the model provides reasonable fits to data.Qualitative tests of the model show that mutability judgments are unaffected by the type of dependency relation and that dependency structure influences iudgments of variability..
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Cites
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Cited by
Keil, F. C. (2006) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190100 · Cited by 1,350
The misunderstood limits of folk science: An illusion of explanatory depth
Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F. (2002) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1 · Cited by 1,032
Causal Models: How People Think about the World and Its Alternatives
Sloman, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.001.0001 · Cited by 677
Self-citationAchieving Rigor in Qualitative Analysis: The Role of Active Categorization in Theory Building
Grodal, S., Anteby, M., & Holm, A. L. (2021) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2018.0482 · Cited by 646
Cree, G. S., & McRae, K. (2003) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.132.2.163 · Cited by 607
Metadata
- Authors
- SLOMAN, S., LOVE, B., & AHN, W.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1998-04
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 189-228
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2060327084
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 11.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.