The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are errors in false belief tasks symptomatic of a broader difficulty with counterfactuality?
Open accessAbstract
When children acknowledge false belief they are handling a counterfactual situation. In three experiments 3-and 4-year-old children were given false belief tasks and physical state tasks which required similar handling of counterfactual situations but which did not require understanding about beliefs or representations: Children were asked to report what the state of the world might be now had an earlier event not occurred. The incidence of realist errors in the false belief and physical state tasks was significantly correlated independently of shared correlations with chronological age and receptive verbal ability. In a fourth experiment, children made significantly fewer realist errors when asked to infer a future hypothetical state. These results provide preliminary evidence consistent with the suggestion that pre-school children's difficulty with false belief is symptomatic of a more general difficulty entertaining counterfactual situations.
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Citations
Cites
Wimmer, H. (1983) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5 · Cited by 6,305
Three-year-olds’ difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit
Perner, J., Leekam, S. R., & Wimmer, H. (1987) · British Journal of Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-835x.1987.tb01048.x · Cited by 1,550
Why the child’s theory of mind really is a theory
GOPNIK, A., & WELLMAN, H. M. (1992) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1992.tb00202.x · Cited by 1,158
Pretending and believing: Issues in the theory of ToMM
Leslie, A. M. (1994) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90029-9 · Cited by 740
Zaitchik, D. (1990) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(90)90036-j · Cited by 420
Cited by
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00304 · Cited by 4,476
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Goldman, A. I. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 · Cited by 1,470
Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind
Bloom, P., & German, T. P. (2000) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00096-2 · Cited by 766
Left temporoparietal junction is necessary for representing someone else's belief
Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Chiavarino, C., & Humphreys, G. W. (2004) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1223 · Cited by 559
Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement
Nichols, S. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195169344.001.0001 · Cited by 515
Metadata
- Authors
- Riggs, K. J., Peterson, D. M., Robinson, E. J., & Mitchell, P.
- Venue
- Cognitive Development
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1998-01
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 73-90
- ISSN
- 0885-2014 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1982162971
- Cited by
- 239
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 7.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Riggs, K. J., Peterson, D. M., Robinson, E. J., & Mitchell, P. (1998). Are errors in false belief tasks symptomatic of a broader difficulty with counterfactuality? Cognitive Development. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0885-2014(98)90021-1
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