The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Commitment and observability in games
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Citations
Cites
Schelling, T. C. (1960) · Cited by 7,673
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912767 · Cited by 1,692
Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes
Kreps, D. M., & Scheinkman, J. A. (1989) · Cournot Oligopoly · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528231.014 · Cited by 1,611
Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes
Kreps, D. M., & Scheinkman, J. A. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003636 · Cited by 1,342
Hicks, J. R., & von Stackelberg, H. (1935) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2224643 · Cited by 1,037
International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy
Spencer, B. J., & Brander, J. A. (1983) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297771 · Cited by 776
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297864 · Cited by 310
Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
Matthews, S. A., & Mirman, L. J. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912047 · Cited by 184
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
Fudenberg, D., Kreps, D. M., & Levine, D. K. (1988) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(88)90009-9 · Cited by 160
Cited by
Athey, S. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00223 · Cited by 567
Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund‐Raising
Andreoni, J. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250044 · Cited by 398
Athey, S., Bagwell, K., & Sanchirico, C. (2004) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/0034-6527.00286 · Cited by 371
Self-citationKANODIA, C., & SAPRA, H. (2016) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12109 · Cited by 316
Home ownership as status competition: Some theory and evidence
Wei, S.-J., Zhang, X., & Liu, Y. (2017) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.12.001 · Cited by 164
Metadata
- Authors
- Bagwell, K.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1995-01
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 271-280
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2044514067
- Cited by
- 301
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 8.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Commitment and observability in games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80001-6
- The paper
- Bagwell, K. (1995). Commitment and observability in games. Games and Economic Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80001-6
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
