The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
Open accessAbstract
This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. We obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's stage-game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes, then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge, as the discount factor tends to 1, to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff, which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy.
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Citations
Cites
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Cited by
The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms
Dellarocas, C. (2003) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.49.10.1407.17308 · Cited by 3,433
Levina, N., & Ross, J. W. (2003) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/30036537 · Cited by 699
Commitment and observability in games
Bagwell, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80001-6 · Cited by 301
Metadata
- Authors
- Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1992-07
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 561
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1554995057
- Cited by
- 310
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 3.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1992). Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297864
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
