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The Additive Fallacy
Abstract
Abstract One very common argument for establishing or challenging the moral relevance of a given feature or distinction consists in comparing two cases where everything else is held constant, but the feature being examined varies between the two cases. If the two cases seem to vary in their moral status (for example, the act which has the feature is permissible, while the one that lacks it is not), then the conclusion is drawn that the feature in question has general moral significance. Similarly, if the two cases seem morally the same (for example, the act has the same moral status regardless of whether it has the feature or not), then the conclusion drawn instead is that the feature in question lacks moral significance. This essay examines the assumptions that lie behind our use of such “contrast arguments,” and suggests that they are far more controversial than we ordinarily realize. In particular, they seem to presuppose a specific model of how morally relevant factors jointly determine moral status, where each factor makes the same positive or negative contribution across the board, regardless of context, and these individual contributions are then summed or added together. Since there is no reason to assume without argument that this picture is correct, and since some familiar moral examples suggest that it doesn’t hold generally, the essay concludes that we need to be much more cautious in the use of such arguments. Contrast arguments (and their cousins) provide no shortcut to the goal of defending fundamental moral theory.
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Citations
Cites
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
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Ritov, I., & Baron, J. (1990) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/bdm.3960030404 · Cited by 854
The Moral Demands of Affluence
Cullity, G. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0199258112.001.0001 · Cited by 325
Moral Generalism and Moral Particularism
Väyrynen, P. (2023) · The Bloomsbury Handbook of Ethics · doi:10.5040/9781350217911.0025 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Kagan, S.
- Venue
- Ethics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1988-10
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 5-31
- ISSN
- 0014-1704 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-297X
- OpenAlex
- W2031803653
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 5.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Kagan, S. (1988). The Additive Fallacy. Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1086/293033
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