Natural Agency: The Case of Bacterial Cognition
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I contrast an ecological account of natural agency with the traditional Cartesian conception using recent research in bacterial cognition and cellular decision making as a test case. I argue that the Cartesian conception—namely, the view that agency presupposes cognition—generates a dilemma between mechanism, the view that bacteria are mere automata, and intellectualism, the view that they exhibit full-blown cognition. Unicellular organisms, however, occupy a middle ground between these two extremes. On the one hand, their capacities and activities are too adaptive to count as mere machines. On the other hand, they lack the open-ended responsiveness of cognitive agents to rational norms. An ecological conception of agency as the gross behavioral capacity to respond to affordances, I argue, does not presuppose cognition and allows for degrees of agency along a continuum, from the simplest adaptive agents, such as unicellular organisms, to the most sophisticated cognitive agents. Bacteria, I conclude, are adaptive agents, hence not mere automata, but not cognitive agents.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundDefining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action
Barandiaran, X. E., Di Paolo, E., & Rohde, M. (2009) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712309343819 · Cited by 497 · cited 1×
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BackgroundOrganisms, Agency, and Evolution
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A Stochastic Single-Molecule Event Triggers Phenotype Switching of a Bacterial Cell
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Cited by
Thinking through other minds: A variational approach to cognition and culture
Veissière, S. P. L., Constant, A., Ramstead, M. J. D., Friston, K. J., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x19001213 · Cited by 348
Reconceiving representation-hungry cognition: an ecological-enactive proposal
Kiverstein, J. D., & Rietveld, E. (2018) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712318772778 · Cited by 150
“For further discussion of the sense in which bacteria qualify as minimal agents, see Fulda (2017).”
BackgroundIs free-energy minimisation the mark of the cognitive?
Kiverstein, J., & Sims, M. (2021) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-021-09788-0 · Cited by 23
“These allegedly primitive and “simple” organisms are not “mere automata”, they exhibit purposive agency (c.f. Burge 2009; Walsh 2015; Di Paolo, Barandiaran and Buhrmann 2017; Fulda 2017).”
BackgroundGendron, M., Mesquita, B., & Barrett, L. F. (2020) · Culture, Mind, and Brain · doi:10.1017/9781108695374.010 · Cited by 20
Minimal model explanations of cognition
Brancazio, N., & Meyer, R. (2023) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-023-00547-4 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- FULDA, F. C.
- Venue
- Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2017
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 69-90
- ISSN
- 2053-4477 (ISSN-L)
- 2053-4485
- OpenAlex
- W2599345170
- Cited by
- 112
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 8.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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