Cited by 632Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceMental Health and PsychiatryFree Will and Agency

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Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory

Carruthers, Peter·2000·Cambridge University Press eBooks

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Abstract

How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness.

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Authors: Carruthers, P.
Affiliations: University of Sheffield (GB)
Corresponding author: Carruthers, Peter
ORCID: Carruthers, Peter
Venue: Cambridge University Press eBooks
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2000-09-28
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511487491
OpenAlex: W4205543764
Cited by: 632
References: 0
Citations by year: 2026: 29 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 54 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 139 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 16
FWCI: 16.76
Type: book
Language: en
Open access: closed
Licence: www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 3289 d)
Locations: Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics: Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords: phenomenal consciousness, higher-order thought, naturalism, problem of consciousness, subjectivity, mind-brain relationship, neural basis of consciousness

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Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory

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