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Cited by 632Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceMental Health and PsychiatryFree Will and Agency

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Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory

Carruthers, Peter·2000·Cambridge University Press eBooks
DOI 10.1017/cbo9780511487491
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Abstract

How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness.

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Metadata

Authors
Carruthers, P.
Affiliations
University of Sheffield (GB)
Corresponding author
Carruthers, Peter
ORCID
Carruthers, Peter
Venue
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Published
2000-09-28
DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511487491
OpenAlex
W4205543764
Cited by
632
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 54 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 139 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 16
FWCI
16.76
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 3289 d)
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
phenomenal consciousness, higher-order thought, naturalism, problem of consciousness, subjectivity, mind-brain relationship, neural basis of consciousness

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