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Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory
Abstract
How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness.
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“First, the UAL approach, while compatible with many specific theories about the nature of consciousness, is not compatible with higher-order thought (HOT) theories of the type defended by Carruthers (2000), Rosenthal (2005) and LeDoux (2019).”
From Unlimited Associative Learning and the origins of consciousness: a primer and some predictions (2020) · cites this paper as Carruthers (2000)
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Raven, M. J. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316779651.014 · Cited by 6
Thoughts on the scientific study of phenomenal consciousness.
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Iyengar, S., Parishar, P., & Mohapatra, A. N. (2017) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_2 · Cited by 5
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“And while it’s true (as Sebastián notes in quoting Rosenthal (??)) that it is intuitive that if we are 12 Carruthers 2000 and Lau 2008, for example. not aware of a state we can’t report it, this only means that HOT (and so consciousness) is needed for reporting, not that reporting ability is…”
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Gupta, S., & Sinha, A. (2013) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-81-322-1587-5_9 · Cited by 4
“include access, phenomenal, self-, subjective, transitive and narrative consciousness, among a myriad others (Nagel 1974; Rosenthal 1986; Dennett 1991; Block 1995; Carruthers 2000).”
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Ferrante, M. (2019) · Journal of Indian Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10781-019-09412-2 · Cited by 4
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“An integral element of this theory, which I will return to in section 4 (also see section 1 above), is the phenomenological 30Cf. Carruthers, 2000, 227f. 31This objection was raised, in similar terms, by an anonymous referee. claim that intentional consciousness is always founded in a form of…”
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Ecological perception affords an explanation of object permanence
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“4 E.g., Davidson 1970; Fodor 1975; Van Gulick 1994; Carruthers 2000 .”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Carruthers, P.
- Affiliations
- University of Sheffield (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Carruthers, Peter
- ORCID
- Carruthers, Peter
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2000-09-28
- OpenAlex
- W4205543764
- Cited by
- 632
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 29 · 2025: 24 · 2024: 54 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 139 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 16
- FWCI
- 16.76
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- phenomenal consciousness, higher-order thought, naturalism, problem of consciousness, subjectivity, mind-brain relationship, neural basis of consciousness
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