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Self to Self

· 2005 · Self to Self
Cited by 119

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Images of myself being Napoleon can scarcely merely be images of the physical figure of Napoleon. … They will rather be images of, for instance, the desolation at Austerlitz as viewed by me vaguely aware of my short stature and my cockaded hat, my hand in my tunic. At the end of “The Imagination and the Self,” Bernard Williams uncovers a common confusion about the range of thoughts in which the metaphysics of personal identity is implicated. When I imagine being someone else, I can be described as imagining that I am the other person – which sounds as if I am imagining a relation of identity between that person and me, David Velleman. As Williams points out, however, this particular way of imagining that I am another person is not really about me or my identity with anyone. If my approach to imagining that I am Napoleon, for example, is to imagine being Napoleon, then I simply imagine a particular situation as experienced by Napoleon. I imagine the landscape at Austerlitz as seen through Napoleon's eyes, the sounds of battle as heard through his ears, the nap of a tunic as felt by his hand. Although Napoleon doesn't appear in the resulting mental image, he does appear in the content of my imagining, since I am imagining Austerlitz specifically as experienced by him.

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Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9780511498862.008

Cites

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Citations

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Metadata

Venue
Self to Self
Published
2005-10-17
Pages
170-202
OpenAlex
W2001435115
Cited by
119
References
12
FWCI
23.90
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Self to Self. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511498862.008
The paper
Self to Self. (2005). Self to Self. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511498862.008

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.