The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Transparency of Experience
Open accessAbstract
A common objection to sense–datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind–independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I argue that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sensedatum theories. In the first part of the paper I explore the form of explanation that an intentional theory of perception can offer of this fact, and I contrast this with an alternative picture labelled naïve realism which can also accommodate and explain the fact of transparency. In the second part of the paper I explore the connection between sensory experience and sensory imagining, arguing that various features of sensory imagining support the hypothesis that in visualising a tree one imagines seeing a tree. In the final part of the paper I argue that the conclusion concerning sensory imagination presents an explanatory challenge for intentional theories of perception which parallels the challenge to sense–datum theories.
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Citations
Cites
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
Image And Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate
Kosslyn, S. M. (1994) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/3653.001.0001 · Cited by 1,977
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409
Cited by
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction
Rosen, G. (2010) · Modality · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007 · Cited by 1,285
Papineau, D. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001 · Cited by 884
A materialist theory of the mind
(2017) · Advances in Consciousness Research · doi:10.1075/aicr.95.c1 · Cited by 820
How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind
BUTTERFILL, S. A., & APPERLY, I. A. (2013) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12036 · Cited by 623
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Metadata
- Authors
- Martin, M. G. F.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-09
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 376-425
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W2113974159
- Cited by
- 1,092
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 24.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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