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Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others
Abstract
To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defence of the reliability of one's faculties, methods and opinions that does not beg the question. Moreover, he shows how this account of intellectual self-trust can be used to understand the degree to which it is reasonable to rely on alternative authorities. This book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the fields of philosophy and the social sciences as well as anyone looking for a unified account of the issues at the centre of intellectual trust.
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Citations
Cited by
Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy
Christensen, D. (2009) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x · Cited by 431
Enoch, D. (2010) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzq070 · Cited by 192
Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal
Dormandy, K. (2024) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2020.49 · Cited by 42
Metadata
- Authors
- Foley, R.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2001-08-13
- OpenAlex
- W580133133
- Cited by
- 274
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 2.64
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.