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Cited by 431

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy

Christensen, David·2009·Philosophy Compass
DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x
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Abstract

How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps ‘epistemic peers’ who seem as well‐qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article describes motivations that push different philosophers towards opposite answers to this question. It identifies a key theoretical principle that divides current writers on the epistemology of disagreement. It then examines arguments bearing on that principle, and on the wider issue. It ends by describing some outstanding questions that thinking about this issue raises.

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Metadata

Authors
Christensen, D.
Venue
Philosophy Compass
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2009-09
Volume
4
Issue
5
Pages
756-767
ISSN
1747-9991 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x
OpenAlex
W2079298969
Cited by
431
References
17
FWCI
84.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x
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Christensen, D. (2009). Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.