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Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value
Abstract
How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires and evaluative judgements and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons.
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Citations
Cited by
The Moral Significance of Class
Sayer, A. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511488863 · Cited by 1,105
Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation
Döring, S. A. (2007) · Dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01105.x · Cited by 466
Class, Moral Worth and Recognition
Sayer, A. (2005) · Sociology · doi:10.1177/0038038505058376 · Cited by 392
Salmela, M. (2012) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2012.647355 · Cited by 120
Slaby, J. (2022) · Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology · doi:10.1080/00071773.2021.1905487 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- Helm, B. W.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2001-04-05
- OpenAlex
- W4254976067
- Cited by
- 476
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 1.32
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.