Self-awareness, social intelligence and schizophrenia
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to review the evidence concerning mirror self-recognition as a measure of self-awareness and examine its applicability to schizophrenia. The evidence suggests that the ability to identify yourself correctly in a mirror is not only related to the capacity to conceive of yourself, but may also be related to your ability to take into account what other individuals may know, want or intend to do. This ability to make accurate inferences about mental states in others (known as mental state attribution, theory of mind or social intelligence) begins to emerge during childhood at the same point in time as mirror self-recognition. Species that fail to recognize themselves in mirrors fail to show any evidence that they can infer mental states in one another. Also consistent with the proposition that these phenomena go hand in hand, recent neuropsychological evidence shows that self-awareness and mental state attribution in humans appear to be a byproduct of brain activity that is related to the frontal cortex. As detailed here and elsewhere in this volume, there is growing evidence that both self-awareness and mental state attribution is impaired in schizophrenic patients and that schizophrenia may be related to frontal lobe dysfunction. Mirror self-recognition Mirrors have a number of unique psychological properties. In principle, mirrors represent a means of seeing yourself as you are seen by others. In front of a mirror you are literally an audience to your own behaviour.
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Citations
Cites
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Self-citationCerebral Representation of One’s Own Past: Neural Networks Involved in Autobiographical Memory
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Towards a functional neuroanatomy of self-processing: effects of faces and words
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Self-recognition and the right prefrontal cortex
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Self-citationAnosognosia and asomatognosia during intracarotid amobarbital inactivation.
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Cited by
The comparative psychology of uncertainty monitoring and metacognition
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Where am I? The neurological correlates of self and other
Platek, S. M., Keenan, J. P., Gallup, G. G., & Mohamed, F. B. (2004) · Cognitive Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2003.11.014 · Cited by 290
Self-citationHere I am: the cortical correlates of visual self-recognition
Devue, C., Collette, F., Balteau, E., Degueldre, C., Luxen, A., Maquet, P., & Brédart, S. (2007) · Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2007.01.055 · Cited by 258
Neural substrates for functionally discriminating self-face from personally familiar faces
Platek, S. M., Loughead, J. W., Gur, R. C., Busch, S., Ruparel, K., Phend, N., Panyavin, I. S., & Langleben, D. D. (2006) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.20168 · Cited by 253
“…parietal lobe activation to self-face is consistent with the right hemisphere/frontal-parietal model of self-awareness [Decety and Chaminade, 2003; Gallup et al., 2003; Jackson and Decety, 2004; Keenan et al., 2001, 2003a,b; Lou et al., 2004; Platek et al., 2004; Sugiura et al., 2000] and our…”
ResultAnderson, J. R., & Gallup, G. G. (2015) · Primates · doi:10.1007/s10329-015-0488-9 · Cited by 212
“Damage to the right hemisphere has also been implicated in mental state attribution deficits and impaired autobiographical memory (see Gallup et al. 2003).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Gallup, G. G., Anderson, J. R., & Platek, S. M.
- Venue
- The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2003-08-07
- Pages
- 147-165
- OpenAlex
- W38265837
- Cited by
- 38
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 24.03
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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