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The nonconceptual content of experience
Open accessAbstract
Concepts and perceptual experience To what extent do our beliefs about the world affect what we see? Our beliefs certainly affect where we choose to look, but do they affect what we see when we look there? Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual–conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. 113). This view – call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ – entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won't. The claim is not, of course, that the child's experience is ‘empty’; but that, unlike the scientist, it does not see the tube as a cathode ray tube. One way of supporting this claim is to say that one cannot see something as an F unless one has the concept F . Since the child plainly lacks the concept of a cathode ray tube, it cannot see it as a cathode ray tube. Although Perceptual Relativism is hard to believe, this supporting suggestion is not so implausible. After all, when we see (and more generally, perceive) the world, the world is presented to us in a particular way; so how can we see it as being that way unless we have some idea or conception of the way it is presented?
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Citations
Cited by
Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of Reasons”
Heck, R. G. (2000) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-109-4-483 · Cited by 562
Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation
Döring, S. A. (2007) · Dialectica · doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01105.x · Cited by 466
Pessoa, L., Thompson, E., & Noë, A. (1998) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x98001757 · Cited by 427
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
Kant and Nonconceptual Content
Hanna, R. (2005) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.0966-8373.2005.00229.x · Cited by 257
Metadata
- Authors
- Crane, T.
- Venue
- The Contents of Experience
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1992-03-12
- Pages
- 136-157
- OpenAlex
- W55678457
- Cited by
- 281
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 4.16
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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