The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Kant and Nonconceptual Content
Abstract
To make a concept, by means of an intuition, into a cognition of an object, is indeed the work of judgment; but the reference of an intuition in general is not. (Kant PC 11: 310–311) 1 The informational states which a subject acquires through perception are non-conceptual, or non-conceptualized. Judgements based upon such states necessarily involve conceptualization: in moving from a perceptual experience to a judgement about the world (usually expressible in some verbal form), one will be exercising basic conceptual skills. But this formulation (in terms of moving from an experience to a judgement) must not be allowed to obscure the general picture. Although the judgments are based upon his experience (i.e. upon the unconceptualized information available to to him), his judgements are not about the informational state. The process of conceptualization or judgment takes the subject from his being in one kind of informational state (with a content of a certain kind, namely, non-conceptual content) to his being in another kind of cognitive state (with a content of a different kind, namely, conceptual content). (Evans 1982: 227) I.
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Cites
Ambrose, A., Wittgenstein, L., & Anscombe, G. E. M. (1954) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2103745 · Cited by 12,192
Fodor, J. A. (1983) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001 · Cited by 7,734
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983) · Cited by 5,190
Cummins, R., & Fodor, J. (1985) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184717 · Cited by 4,791
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
Knowledge and the Flow of Information.
Alston, W. P., & Dretske, F. I. (1983) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184492 · Cited by 3,286
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind
Sellars, W. (1997) · University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy (University of Minnesota) · Cited by 2,727
Smith, E. E., & Medin, D. L. (1981) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/harvard.9780674866270 · Cited by 2,606
Reference and Definite Descriptions
Donnellan, K. S. (1966) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183143 · Cited by 2,505
Cited by
Knowing Blue: Early Buddhist Accounts of Non-Conceptual Sense Perception
Sharf, R. (2017) · Philosophy East and West · doi:10.1353/pew.0.0126 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Hanna, R.
- Venue
- European Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 247-290
- ISSN
- 0966-8373 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0378
- OpenAlex
- W2026475994
- Cited by
- 257
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 30.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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