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Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers
Abstract
David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science, to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion. Professors Epstein and O'Halloran produce their own deductive specification of the conditions for making or delegating policy, gather a rich, original data set on delegation and discretion in the postwar era to test the propositions derived from their model, and devise appropriate statistical tests to assess the validity of their propositions. With implications for the study of constitutional design, political delegation, legislative organization, administrative law, and the role of the executive in policy making, this book redefines the study of legislative-executive relations under separate powers.
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Cited by
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Feiock, R. C. (2013) · Policy Studies Journal · doi:10.1111/psj.12023 · Cited by 691
KEEFER, P., & STASAVAGE, D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000777 · Cited by 636
Causes and Consequences of Polarization
Barber, M. J., & McCarty, N. (2015) · Solutions to Political Polarization in America · doi:10.1017/cbo9781316091906.002 · Cited by 375
Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215
The strongman presidency and the two logics of presidential power
Howell, W. G., & Moe, T. M. (2023) · Presidential Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/psq.12830 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1999-11-13
- OpenAlex
- W4232663284
- Cited by
- 1,046
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 10.75
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S. (1999). Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511609312
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