The DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929
Abstract
This book, first published in 2003, addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse? In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governments do not have to enforce property rights as a public good. Instead, they may enforce property rights selectively (as a private good), and share the resulting rents with the group of asset holders who are integrated into the government. Focusing on Mexico, this book explains how the property rights system was constructed during the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship (1876–1911) and then explores how this property rights system either survived, or was reconstructed. The result is an analytic economic history of Mexico under both stability and instability, and a generalizable framework about the interaction of political and economic institutions.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
North, D. C. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808678 · Cited by 32,691
Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries
Barro, R. J. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937943 · Cited by 9,263
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (1971) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.2307/3003160 · Cited by 8,098
(1991) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 6,037
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466922 · Cited by 5,791
States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China
Skocpol, T. (1979) · Cambridge University Press · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511815805 · Cited by 5,408
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700009451 · Cited by 5,300
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Structure and Change in Economic History
George, P., & North, D. C. (1983) · The Canadian Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/135165 · Cited by 4,564
Cited by
Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse
HABER, S., & MENALDO, V. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000584 · Cited by 1,128
Self-citationFinance, Inequality, and Poverty: Cross-Country Evidence
Levine, R., Beck, T., & Demirguc-Kunt, A. (2004) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-3338 · Cited by 451
Gehlbach, S., & Keefer, P. (2011) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2011.04.002 · Cited by 429
Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies
Acemoglu, D. (2008) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2008.6.1.1 · Cited by 375
Roe, M. J., & Siegel, J. I. (2011) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2011.02.001 · Cited by 341
Metadata
- Authors
- Haber, S., Razo, A., & Maurer, N.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2003-05-26
- OpenAlex
- W4211172382
- Cited by
- 382
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 16.38
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511615610
- The paper
- Haber, S., Razo, A., & Maurer, N. (2003). The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511615610
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.