The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Interactional biases in human thinking
Open accessAbstract
The human mind is something of an embarassment to certain disciplines, notably economics, decision theory and others that have found the model of the rational consumer to be a powerful one. (Schelling 1988: 353.) Background This chapter sets out to weave an improbable web through such topics as animism, common tendencies in the purchase of soap powder, extra-terrestrial lifeforms, the phrase ‘the whatdoyoucallit’, and the theory of communication. The thread, if it doesn't break, is the theme of a systematic bias in human thinking, in the direction of interactive thinking (E. Goody's anticipatory interactive planning or AIP). Because the argument is somewhat indirect, let me state the thesis right here in the beginning in semi-syllogistic form: Communication is logically impossible Nevertheless we humans can communicate Therefore, we must use non-logical heuristics and a special form of reasoning to bridge the gap For communication to work routinely, these heuristics must be dominant in our thinking all the time Therefore, these heuristics spill over to bias our thinking in non-communication domains. As in the famous conclusion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus , where we are advised not to think that which cannot be thought, so there is a certain paradox in thinking about biases in human thinking. (You can climb outside human thought, Wittgenstein hinted, just so long as you throw the ladder away and climb quickly back in.) We can only do so with real confidence, perhaps, where we can discern an indubitably correct way of thinking, guaranteed by the laws of mathematics or logic, from which human thinking tends to deviate.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
Tversky, A., & Koehler, D. J. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.547 · Cited by 1,167
Metadata
- Authors
- Levinson, S. C.
- Venue
- Social Intelligence and Interaction
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1995-03-23
- Pages
- 221-260
- OpenAlex
- W1556398798
- Cited by
- 295
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 16.39
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Interactional biases in human thinking. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511621710.014
- The paper
- Levinson, S. C. (1995). Interactional biases in human thinking. Social Intelligence and Interaction. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511621710.014
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.