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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 9 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Panpsychism and Russellian Monism

Open access
Alter, Torin, Coleman, Sam · 2019 · The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism

Abstract

According to Russellian panpsychism, familiar conscious experiences are constituted by phenomenal properties that might be unfamiliar, namely, phenomenal properties that categorically ground dispositional properties posited by fundamental physics. In this entry, we discuss two challenges to that theory: that it fails to adequately integrate consciousness into physical causation ( Howell 2015 ); and that its alleged advantages over traditional dualist and traditional physicalist theories are illusory ( Kind 2015 ). We argue that neither challenge is insurmountable.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This chapter examines whether Russellian monism has the advertised advantages over traditional materialism and dualism by addressing two challenges: Howell’s modified exclusion argument and Kind’s claim that Russellian monism does not transcend the dualist/physicalist divide. The authors argue that neither challenge is insurmountable and that panpsychist Russellian monism remains a contender position.

Key findings

  • Russellian monists can respond to the anti-materialist zombie conceivability argument in at least three ways: reject premise 1 (that a zombie world is ideally conceivable), reject premise 2 (that ideal conceivability entails metaphysical possibility), or accept the anti-materialist conclusion.
  • Russellian monists can respond to the exclusion argument in at least three ways: deny mental distinctness, deny physical adequacy, or deny the argument’s validity; the authors say Russellian monism need not posit causal gaps in physical explanations.
  • Howell’s modified exclusion argument relocates causal competition to aspects of RM properties, but the authors discuss compatibilist and necessitarian strategies and argue that the modified argument does not decisively defeat Russellian monism.
  • Kind argues that Russellian monism is neutral between phenomenal monism and physical monism and therefore does not settle the fundamentality question; the authors reply that on one interpretation this is unobjectionable but does not show Russellian monism lacks its advertised advantages, and on another interpretation Kind’s premise 1 is questionable.

Methods

  • Conceptual/philosophical analysis; no empirical data, sample, or statistical analysis are reported.
  • The chapter reconstructs and evaluates two objections—Robert J. Howell’s modified exclusion argument and Amy Kind’s argument that Russellian monism does not transcend the dualist/physicalist divide.
  • The main analysis develops possible Russellian monist responses, especially compatibilist and necessitarian strategies, and assesses whether those responses succeed.

Limitations

  • The paper states that Russellian monism faces serious objections beyond the two addressed, that a panprotopsychist version seems no less viable, and that the intrinsic natures of protophenomenal and phenomenal properties are largely unknown, making confident judgments about deducibility relations premature.
  • The paper states that compatibilism faces objections, including that the photosynthesis analogy is inexact and that Howell might object it leaves Russellian monism in a position similar to interactionist dualism; it also notes Howell rejects necessitarianism as dialectically unacceptable, though the authors dispute that.
  • Evident from the text: the chapter is a conceptual defense rather than an empirical test, and it does not settle the fundamentality question or decide between phenomenal and physical monism.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.4324/9781315717708-20

Cites

31 of 31 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

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Metadata

Authors
Alter, T., & Coleman, S.
Venue
The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2019-12-10
Pages
230-242
OpenAlex
W2997361186
Cited by
27
References
1
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 22 · 2021: 2
FWCI
4.19
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
phenomenal properties, dispositional properties, consciousness, physical causality, physicalism, dualism, philosophy of mind

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Panpsychism and Russellian Monism. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.4324/9781315717708-20
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Alter, T., & Coleman, S. (2019). Panpsychism and Russellian Monism. The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315717708-20

Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.