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Panpsychism and Russellian Monism
Open accessAbstract
According to Russellian panpsychism, familiar conscious experiences are constituted by phenomenal properties that might be unfamiliar, namely, phenomenal properties that categorically ground dispositional properties posited by fundamental physics. In this entry, we discuss two challenges to that theory: that it fails to adequately integrate consciousness into physical causation ( Howell 2015 ); and that its alleged advantages over traditional dualist and traditional physicalist theories are illusory ( Kind 2015 ). We argue that neither challenge is insurmountable.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This chapter examines whether Russellian monism has the advertised advantages over traditional materialism and dualism by addressing two challenges: Howell’s modified exclusion argument and Kind’s claim that Russellian monism does not transcend the dualist/physicalist divide. The authors argue that neither challenge is insurmountable and that panpsychist Russellian monism remains a contender position.
Key findings
- Russellian monists can respond to the anti-materialist zombie conceivability argument in at least three ways: reject premise 1 (that a zombie world is ideally conceivable), reject premise 2 (that ideal conceivability entails metaphysical possibility), or accept the anti-materialist conclusion.
- Russellian monists can respond to the exclusion argument in at least three ways: deny mental distinctness, deny physical adequacy, or deny the argument’s validity; the authors say Russellian monism need not posit causal gaps in physical explanations.
- Howell’s modified exclusion argument relocates causal competition to aspects of RM properties, but the authors discuss compatibilist and necessitarian strategies and argue that the modified argument does not decisively defeat Russellian monism.
- Kind argues that Russellian monism is neutral between phenomenal monism and physical monism and therefore does not settle the fundamentality question; the authors reply that on one interpretation this is unobjectionable but does not show Russellian monism lacks its advertised advantages, and on another interpretation Kind’s premise 1 is questionable.
Methods
- Conceptual/philosophical analysis; no empirical data, sample, or statistical analysis are reported.
- The chapter reconstructs and evaluates two objections—Robert J. Howell’s modified exclusion argument and Amy Kind’s argument that Russellian monism does not transcend the dualist/physicalist divide.
- The main analysis develops possible Russellian monist responses, especially compatibilist and necessitarian strategies, and assesses whether those responses succeed.
Limitations
- The paper states that Russellian monism faces serious objections beyond the two addressed, that a panprotopsychist version seems no less viable, and that the intrinsic natures of protophenomenal and phenomenal properties are largely unknown, making confident judgments about deducibility relations premature.
- The paper states that compatibilism faces objections, including that the photosynthesis analogy is inexact and that Howell might object it leaves Russellian monism in a position similar to interactionist dualism; it also notes Howell rejects necessitarianism as dialectically unacceptable, though the authors dispute that.
- Evident from the text: the chapter is a conceptual defense rather than an empirical test, and it does not settle the fundamentality question or decide between phenomenal and physical monism.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
0 Valid · 1 Not valid · 8 Not checked · 104 Own results and interpretations
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Russellian monists can respond to the above conceivability argument in at least three ways.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“More generally, Russellian monism does not seem to be threatened in the way traditional dualism is by the problem of finding a role for (proto)consciousness in the causation of physical events.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Arguably, a complete physical duplicate of the actual world would also have to include instantiations of any (proto)phenomenal properties that, in the actual world, ground the dispositional properties that physics describes.”
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Russellian monists can respond to the exclusion argument in at least three ways.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Russellian monists (necessitarian and otherwise) need not accept zombie-style conceivability arguments without qualification.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
58 more claims
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Citations
Cites
Jackson, F. (1982) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2960077 · Cited by 2,477
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications
Lewis, D. (1972) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048407212341301 · Cited by 1,580
Jackson, F. (1986) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026143 · Cited by 1,422
Schaffer, J. (2009) · Metametaphysics · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199546046.003.0012 · Cited by 1,382
The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays
Shoemaker, S. (1996) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624674 · Cited by 934
The Character of Consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.001.0001 · Cited by 911
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?
Chalmers, D. J. (2002) · Conceivability and Possibility · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250890.003.0004 · Cited by 894
Yablo, S. (1992) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185535 · Cited by 687
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind · doi:10.1002/9780470998762.ch5 · Cited by 574
Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism
Strawson, G. (2008) · Real Materialism · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0003 · Cited by 558
Cited by
The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism
Alter, T. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198840459.001.0001 · Cited by 40
Self-citationThe merits of higher-order thought theories
Coleman, S. (2018) · Trans/Form/Ação · doi:10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41esp.04.p31 · Cited by 18
Self-citationConsciousness and Categorical Properties
Brown, C. D. (2021) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00359-5 · Cited by 12
How Russellian Physicalism Helps Solve the Mind-Body Problem
Brown, C. D. (2025) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-025-00880-3 · Cited by 3
Does Panpsychism Explain Mental Causation?
Baysan, U. (2024) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-024-00816-5 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Alter, T., & Coleman, S.
- Venue
- The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2019-12-10
- Pages
- 230-242
- OpenAlex
- W2997361186
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 22 · 2021: 2
- FWCI
- 4.19
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- phenomenal properties, dispositional properties, consciousness, physical causality, physicalism, dualism, philosophy of mind
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