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Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership

Lane, Timothy · 2012 · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 125 of the 127 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1007/s11097-012-9252-4

Cites

125 of 125 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Citations

Cites

Show all 125 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Damasio, A. (2010). Self comes to mind: constructing the conscious mind. New York: Pantheon.
  2. Feinberg, T. E. (2009). From axons to identity: neurological explorations of the self. New York: W.W. Norton.
  3. Hirstein, W. (2009). Confabulations. In J. Bickle (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and the neurosciences (pp. 474–512). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cited by

See all 37

Metadata

Authors
Lane, T.
Affiliations
National Chengchi University (TW)
Corresponding author
Lane, Timothy
Venue
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Published
2012-02-19
Volume
11
Issue
2
Pages
251-286
ISSN
  • 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8676
OpenAlex
W1967470647
Cited by
33
References
127
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 1
FWCI
4.35
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
Locations
  • Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • Taipei Medical University Repository (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
mineness, subjective perspective, selfhood, narrative self, minimal self

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How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1007/s11097-012-9252-4
The paper
Lane, T. (2012). Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9252-4

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.