Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 125 of the 127 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not
Zahavi, D., & Kriegel, U. (2015) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · doi:10.4324/9781315889634-9 · Cited by 66
Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia
Henriksen, M. G., Parnas, J., & Zahavi, D. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.102770 · Cited by 117
“In this article, we focus solely on experiences of thought insertion. it is not stamped with a meish quality; and, for-me-ness does not play a determining role in its constitution” (Lane, 2012, 281).”
BackgroundInfluentialKlein, S. B. (2013) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00003 · Cited by 94
“Taken together, these studies focus attention on ownership as an aspect, or form, of consciousness that can come undone under certain conditions (e.g., Klein and Nichols, 2012; Lane, 2012).”
Klein, S. B. (2016) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1007150 · Cited by 92
Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Selfhood: a Reply to some Critics
Zahavi, D. (2018) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-018-0403-6 · Cited by 86
Metadata
- Authors
- Lane, T.
- Affiliations
- National Chengchi University (TW)
- Corresponding author
- Lane, Timothy
- ORCID
- Lane, Timothy
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2012-02-19
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 251-286
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W1967470647
- Semantic Scholar
- 9fe50a4cd7a916823461a4b5e9fab170e0ccdd30
- Cited by
- 33
- References
- 127
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 4.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Taipei Medical University Repository (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- mineness, subjective perspective, selfhood, narrative self, minimal self
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- The paper
- Lane, T. (2012). Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9252-4
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.