The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
From the Ballot to the Blackboard: The Redistributive Political Economy of Education
Abstract
From the Ballot to the Blackboard provides the first comprehensive account of the political economy of education spending across the developed and developing world. The book demonstrates how political forces like democracy and political partisanship and economic factors like globalization deeply impact the choices made by voters, parties, and leaders in financing education. The argument is developed through three stories that track the historical development of education: first, its original expansion from the elite to the masses; second, the partisan politics of education in industrialized states; and third, the politics of higher education. The book uses a variety of complementary methods to demonstrate the importance of redistributive political motivations in explaining education policy, including formal modeling, statistical analysis of survey data and both sub-national and cross-national data, and historical case analyses of countries including the Philippines, India, Malaysia, England, Sweden, and Germany.
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Cited by
Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2019) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/700936 · Cited by 1,524
The Political Economy of Ownership: Housing Markets and the Welfare State
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Self-citationHarding, R., & Stasavage, D. (2014) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381613001254 · Cited by 311
Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach
Ansell, B., & Samuels, D. (2010) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414010376915 · Cited by 257
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ansell, B. W.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2010-03-22
- OpenAlex
- W2890067758
- Cited by
- 286
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 6.93
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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