The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What Democracy Does (and Doesn’t Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections
Abstract
Does democracy affect the provision of basic services? We advance on existing empirical work on this subject by exploring the potential mechanisms through which a democratic transition may prompt a government to alter provision of basic services to its citizens. In an environment of weak state capacity, in which it is difficult for voters to attribute outcomes to executive actions, we suggest that electoral competition is most likely to lead to changes in policies where executive action is verifiable. Considering the context of African primary education as an example, we suggest that electoral competition will therefore give governments an incentive to abolish school fees, but it will have less effect on the provision of school inputs, precisely because executive actions on these issues are more difficult to monitor. We evaluate this claim by approaching it in three different ways, using cross-national as well as individual-level data, including an original data set on primary school fee abolitions. First we show that in Africa, democracies have higher rates of school attendance than nondemocracies. Moreover, evidence suggests that this is primarily due to the fact that democracies are more likely to abolish school fees, not to the fact that they provide more inputs. We then estimate the likelihood that a government will abolish school fees subsequent to an election, taking account of endogeneity concerns involving election timing. Finally, we use survey data from Kenya to provide evidence suggesting that citizens condition their voting intentions on an outcome that a politician can control directly, in this case abolishing school fees, but not on outcomes over which politicians have much more indirect influence, such as local school quality.
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Cites
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Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
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The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217 · cited 2×
“2Contributions to this voluminous literature include Blaydes and Kayser (2011), Ross (2006), Kudamatsu (2012), Besley and Kudamatsu (2006), Baum and Lake (2003), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Stasavage (2005a), Brown and Hunter (2004), Adsera, Boix, and Payne (2003), and Min (2010).”
BackgroundNew Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions
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Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable
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Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective
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Cited by
Who Benefits from Distributive Politics? How the Outcome One Studies Affects the Answer One Gets
Kramon, E., & Posner, D. N. (2013) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592713001035 · Cited by 317
Democratic Backsliding in Africa?
(2022) · Oxford University Press · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192867322.001.0001 · Cited by 39
Are electoral autocracies better for the poor? Evidence from social assistance programs
Fails, M. D. (2020) · Research & Politics · doi:10.1177/2053168020950152 · Cited by 10
“When such goods are delivered, their outcomes may be invisible to prospective voters and therefore inefficient means of generating electoral support (Harding and Stasavage, 2014).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Harding, R., & Stasavage, D.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2014-01
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 229-245
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W1976942754
- Cited by
- 311
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 56.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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