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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Ostrom, Elinor · 1990 · Cambridge University Press eBooks

Abstract

The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

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Metadata

Authors
Ostrom, E.
Venue
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Published
1990-11-30
OpenAlex
W4233654598
Cited by
20,653
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 1992 · 2025: 1607 · 2024: 1136 · 2023: 1223 · 2022: 1085 · 2021: 1183 · 2020: 1165 · 2019: 1109 · 2018: 1080 · 2017: 967 · 2016: 835 · 2015: 798 · 2014: 764 · 2013: 687 · 2012: 611
FWCI
58.20
Type
book
Language
ru
Open access
closed
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Global and Planetary Change › Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
commons governance, common-pool resources, tragedy of the commons, institutional analysis, state control of resources, voluntary organisations, irrigation communities, water rights, fisheries, forests, meadows, natural resource policy

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511807763
The paper
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511807763

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.