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Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Abstract
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
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In the citing paper
“Consensus decision making. People hate being bossed around but will work hard to implement a consensus decision – to do what we want, not what they want. In addition, the best decisions often require knowledge of local circumstances that we have and they lack, making consensus decision making doubly important.”
From Evolving the future: Toward a science of intentional change (2014) · cites this paper as Ostrom 1990
In the citing paper
“Fast and fair conflict resolution. When conflicts arise, they must be resolved quickly and in a manner that the parties consider fair. This typically involves a hearing in which respected members of the group, who can be expected to be impartial, make an equitable decision.”
From Evolving the future: Toward a science of intentional change (2014) · cites this paper as Ostrom 1990
In the citing paper
“Graduated sanctions. Friendly, gentle reminders are usually sufficient to keep people in solid citizen mode, but there must also be the capacity to apply stronger sanctions, such as punishment or exclusion, if transgressions continue.”
From Evolving the future: Toward a science of intentional change (2014) · cites this paper as Ostrom 1990
In the citing paper
“She did this by assembling a database of groups around the world that were attempting to manage common-pool resources.”
From Evolving the future: Toward a science of intentional change (2014) · cites this paper as Ostrom 1990
In the citing paper
“Polycentric governance. When groups are nested within a larger society, relationships among groups and between them and higher-level entities (such as state and federal regulatory agencies) must reflect the same principles outlined above for single groups”
From Evolving the future: Toward a science of intentional change (2014) · cites this paper as Ostrom 1990
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Cited by
Campbell, J. L. (2007) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2007.25275684 · Cited by 4,906
Social and ecological resilience: are they related?
Adger, W. N. (2000) · Progress in Human Geography · doi:10.1191/030913200701540465 · Cited by 4,825
The Struggle to Govern the Commons
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1091015 · Cited by 4,209
“Fig. 3 General principles for robust governance of environmental resources (left and right columns) and the governance requirements they help meet (center column) [ 13 , 158].”
Institutions and axioms: an extension and update of service-dominant logic
Vargo, S. L., & Lusch, R. F. (2016) · Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science · doi:10.1007/s11747-015-0456-3 · Cited by 3,663
Metadata
- Authors
- Ostrom, E.
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1990-11-30
- OpenAlex
- W4233654598
- Cited by
- 20,653
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1992 · 2025: 1607 · 2024: 1136 · 2023: 1223 · 2022: 1085 · 2021: 1183 · 2020: 1165 · 2019: 1109 · 2018: 1080 · 2017: 967 · 2016: 835 · 2015: 798 · 2014: 764 · 2013: 687 · 2012: 611
- FWCI
- 58.20
- Type
- book
- Language
- ru
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Global and Planetary Change › Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- commons governance, common-pool resources, tragedy of the commons, institutional analysis, state control of resources, voluntary organisations, irrigation communities, water rights, fisheries, forests, meadows, natural resource policy
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511807763
- The paper
- Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511807763
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.