The DOI matches its Crossref record; 164 of the 164 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?
Abstract
The interpretation of the gap between descriptive and normative models in the human reasoning and decision making literature has been the subject of contentious debate since the early 1980s (Baron, 1994; Cohen, 1981, 1983; Evans & Over, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1996; Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1983, 1996; Koehler, 1996; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Stein, 1996), a debate that has arisen because some investigators wish to interpret the gap between the descriptive and the normative as indicating that human cognition is characterized by systematic irrationalities. Due to the emphasis that these theorists placed on reforming human cognition, they have been labelled the Meliorists by Stanovich (1999). Disputing this contention are numerous investigators (termed the Panglossians ; see Stanovich, 1999) who argue that there are other reasons why reasoning might not accord with normative theory – reasons that prevent the ascription of irrationality to subjects (Cohen, 1981; Stein, 1996). First, instances of reasoning might depart from normative standards due to performance errors – temporary lapses of attention, memory deactivation, and other sporadic information processing mishaps. Second, there may be stable and inherent computational limitations that prevent the normative response (Cherniak, 1986; Goldman, 1978; Harman, 1995; Oaksford & Chater, 1993, 1995, 1998; Stich, 1990). Third, in interpreting performance, we might be applying the wrong normative model to the task (Koehler, 1996).
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Cites
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Cited by
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
Chain-Of-Thought Prompting Elicits Reasoning in Large Language Models
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“If I look at the mass I will never act”: Psychic numbing and genocide
Slovic, P. (2007) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500000061 · Cited by 832
If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act: Psychic Numbing and Genocide
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An evaluation of dual-process theories of reasoning
Osman, M. (2004) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03196730 · Cited by 444
Metadata
- Authors
- Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F.
- Venue
- Heuristics and Biases
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2002-07-08
- Pages
- 421-440
- OpenAlex
- W2953323811
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 164
- FWCI
- 1.81
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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