The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment
Abstract
Uncertainty is an unavoidable aspect of the human condition. Many significant choices must be based on beliefs about the likelihood of such uncertain events as the guilt of a defendant, the result of an election, the future value of the dollar, the outcome of a medical operation, or the response of a friend. Because we normally do not have adequate formal models for computing the probabilities of such events, intuitive judgment is often the only practical method for assessing uncertainty. The question of how lay people and experts evaluate the probabilities of uncertain events has attracted considerable research interest in the last decade (see, e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Much of this research has compared intuitive inferences and probability judgments to the rules of statistics and the laws of probability. The student of judgment uses the probability calculus as a standard of comparison much as a student of perception might compare the perceived sizes of objects to their physical sizes. Unlike the correct size of objects, however, the “correct” probability of events is not easily defined. Because individuals who have different knowledge or who hold different beliefs must be allowed to assign different probabilities to the same event, no single value can be correct for all people. Furthermore, a correct probability cannot always be determined even for a single person.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
Self-citationAvailability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90033-9 · Cited by 9,984
Self-citationA Mathematical Theory of Evidence
Shafer, G. (1976) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691214696 · Cited by 9,083
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Fuzzy sets as a basis for a theory of possibility
Zadeh, L. A. (1978) · Fuzzy Sets and Systems · doi:10.1016/0165-0114(78)90029-5 · Cited by 8,119
Tversky, A. (1977) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.84.4.327 · Cited by 7,414
Self-citationOn the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
Self-citationUpper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued Mapping
Dempster, A. P. (1967) · The Annals of Mathematical Statistics · doi:10.1214/aoms/1177698950 · Cited by 6,126
D., C. P., Rosch, E., & Loyd, B. B. (1979) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1421578 · Cited by 5,264
Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1972) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90016-3 · Cited by 4,851
Self-citation
Cited by
Fuzzy-trace theory: An interim synthesis
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1995) · Learning and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/1041-6080(95)90031-4 · Cited by 1,203
Knowledge Calibration: What Consumers Know and What They Think They Know
Alba, J. W., & Hutchinson, J. W. (2000) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/314317 · Cited by 828
The median split: Robust, refined, and revived
Iacobucci, D., Posavac, S. S., Kardes, F. R., Schneider, M. J., & Popovich, D. L. (2015) · Journal of Consumer Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2015.06.014 · Cited by 475
(2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198843702.001.0001 · Cited by 138
A Manager and an AI Walk into a Bar: Does ChatGPT Make Biased Decisions Like We Do?
Chen, Y., Kirshner, S. N., Ovchinnikov, A., Andiappan, M., & Jenkin, T. (2025) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2023.0279 · Cited by 143
Metadata
- Authors
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D.
- Venue
- Reasoning
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2008-05-05
- Pages
- 114-135
- OpenAlex
- W1598863591
- Cited by
- 375
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 11.24
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511814273.008
- The paper
- Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (2008). Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment. Reasoning. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511814273.008
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.