The DOI matches its Crossref record; 71 of the 71 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Motivation and Agency
Abstract
What is motivation, and what is its place in the lives of intelligent agents? This is Mele's guiding question. His search for an answer is sensitive to the theoretical concerns of philosophers of mind and action and moral philosophers, and is informed by empirical work in psychology. Mele defends answers to a web of questions about motivation and human agency, including the following: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical demands of Kantian or other kinds on a theory of human motivation? Where does the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in common? What room will an acceptable view of the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self‐control? Will a proper account of motivated, goal‐directed action be a causal account, and can a causal theory of the nature and explanation of action accommodate human agency par excellence? His answers collectively provide a distinctive, detailed, comprehensive, causal theory of human agency.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985) · doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-2271-7 · Cited by 26,772
The case for motivated reasoning.
Kunda, Z. (1990) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 · Cited by 9,022
Korsgaard, C. M., & O'Neill, O. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511554476 · Cited by 4,013
Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior.
Atkinson, J. W. (1957) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0043445 · Cited by 3,706
Davidson, D. (1963) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023177 · Cited by 2,938
The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays
Frankfurt, H. G. (1988) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818172 · Cited by 2,634
Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action
Libet, B. (1985) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00044903 · Cited by 2,623
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 · Cited by 2,249
Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y.-W. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211 · Cited by 2,094
Williams, B. (1993) · University of California Press eBooks · doi:10.1525/9780520915282 · Cited by 2,071
Cited by
Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action
Barandiaran, X. E., Di Paolo, E., & Rohde, M. (2009) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712309343819 · Cited by 497
Mele, A. R. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195305043.001.0001 · Cited by 493
Self-citationLibertarian Accounts of Free Will
Clarke, R. (2003) · doi:10.1093/019515987x.001.0001 · Cited by 474
Parallel prototyping leads to better design results, more divergence, and increased self-efficacy
Dow, S. P., Glassco, A., Kass, J., Schwarz, M., Schwartz, D. L., & Klemmer, S. R. (2010) · ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction · doi:10.1145/1879831.1879836 · Cited by 367
Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study
Livingston, P. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199278067.001.0001 · Cited by 276
Metadata
- Authors
- Mele, A. R.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2003-02-13
- OpenAlex
- W1512422251
- Cited by
- 545
- References
- 71
- FWCI
- 68.27
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Motivation and Agency. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/019515617x.001.0001
- The paper
- Mele, A. R. (2003). Motivation and Agency. https://doi.org/10.1093/019515617x.001.0001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.