The paradox of human expertise: why experts get it wrong
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Expertise is correctly, but one-sidedly, associated with special abilities and enhanced performance. The other side of expertise, however, is surreptitiously hidden. Along with expertise, performance may also be degraded, culminating in a lack of flexibility and error. Expertise is demystified by explaining the brain functions and cognitive architecture involved in being an expert. These information processing mechanisms, the very making of expertise, entail computational trade-offs that sometimes result in paradoxical functional degradation. For example, being an expert entails using schemas, selective attention, chunking information, automaticity and more reliance on top-down information, all of which allows experts to perform quickly and efficiently; however, these very mechanisms restrict flexibility and control, may cause the experts to miss and ignore important information, introduce tunnel vision and bias and can cause other effects that degrade performance. Such phenomena are apparent in a wide range of expert domains, from medical professionals and forensic examiners, to military fighter pilots and financial traders. Expertise is highly sought after – only those with special abilities, after years of training and experience, can achieve those exceptional brain powers that make them experts. Indeed, being an expert is most often prestigious, well-paid, respected and in high demand. However, examining expertise in depth raises some interesting and complex questions. In this chapter, I will take apart and reject the myth that experts merely have superior performance per se.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Cognitive and human factors in expert decision making: Six fallacies and the eight sources of bias
Dror, I. E. (2020) · Analytical Chemistry · doi:10.1021/acs.analchem.0c00704 · Cited by 333
Self-citationFixation and creativity in concept development: The attitudes and practices of expert designers
Crilly, N. (2015) · Design Studies · doi:10.1016/j.destud.2015.01.002 · Cited by 330
The forensic confirmation bias: A comparison between experts and novices
van den Eeden, C. A. J., de Poot, C. J., & van Koppen, P. J. (2019) · Journal of Forensic Sciences · doi:10.1111/1556-4029.13817 · Cited by 68
Biased and biasing: the hidden bias cascade and bias snowball effects
Dror, I. E. (2025) · Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.3390/bs15040490 · Cited by 29
Self-citationGrowns, B., & Kukucka, J. (2021) · Applied Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1002/acp.3800 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Dror, I. E.
- Venue
- The Paradoxical Brain
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2011-07-21
- Pages
- 177-188
- OpenAlex
- W2106112885
- Cited by
- 109
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 17.45
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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