Cited by 2,443Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsClinical Reasoning and Diagnostic SkillsSport Psychology and Performance

Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree.

Kahneman, Daniel, Klein, Gary·2009·American Psychologist

Abstract

This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conflicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes flawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual's opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy.

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Crossref · 10.1037/a0016755

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66 of 66 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • There is no subjective marker that distinguishes correct reasoning processes from erroneous ones.

    “There is also no subjective marker that distinguishes correct reasoning processes from erroneous ones (Kahneman and Klein, 2009).”

    From Human- versus Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as Kahneman and Klein, 2009

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Authors
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G.
Affiliations
  • Princeton University (US)
  • Applied Research Associates (United States) (US)
Venue
American Psychologist
Published
2009
Volume
64
Issue
6
Pages
515-526
ISSN
  • 0003-066X (ISSN-L)
  • 1935-990X
OpenAlex
W2140543255
Cited by
2,443
References
66
Citations by year
2026: 169 · 2025: 173 · 2024: 178 · 2023: 178 · 2022: 215 · 2021: 168 · 2020: 199 · 2019: 180 · 2018: 145 · 2017: 119 · 2016: 126 · 2015: 139 · 2014: 153 · 2013: 113 · 2012: 95
FWCI
37.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • American Psychologist (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Family Practice › Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Sport Psychology and Performance
Keywords
professional intuition, heuristics and biases, naturalistic decision making, overconfidence, judgment accuracy, environmental predictability, subjective experience
MeSH terms
Algorithms, Choice Behavior, Decision Making, Humans, Judgment, Prejudice, Intuition, Recognition, Psychology

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