The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?
Abstract
My object in these pages is to juxtapose the view of scientific development outlined in my book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , with the better known views of our chairman, Sir Karl Popper. Ordinarily I should decline such an undertaking, for I am not so sanguine as Sir Karl about the utility of confrontations. Besides, I have admired his work for too long to turn critic easily at this date. Nevertheless, I am persuaded that for this occasion the attempt must be made. Even before my book was published two and a half years ago, I had begun to discover special and often puzzling characteristics of the relation between my views and his. That relation and the divergent reactions I have encountered to it suggest that a disciplined comparison of the two may produce peculiar enlightenment. Let me say why I think this could occur. On almost all the occasions when we turn explicitly to the same problems, Sir Karl's view of science and my own are very nearly identical. We are both concerned with the dynamic process by which scientific knowledge is acquired rather than with the logical structure of the products of scientific research. Given that concern, both of us emphasize, as legitimate data, the facts and also the spirit of actual scientific life, and both of us turn often to history to find them. From this pool of shared data, we draw many of the same conclusions.
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Citations
Cites
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Kuhn, T. S., & Schlegel, R. (1963) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.3050879 · Cited by 35,538
Self-citationThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition
Kuhn, T. S., & Hacking, I. (2012) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226458144.001.0001 · Cited by 21,170
Self-citation(2020) · Radical Treatment · doi:10.2307/j.ctvw1d7dg.9 · Cited by 3,373
Aspects of Scientific Explanation.
Resnik, M. D., & Hempel, C. G. (1966) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2106169 · Cited by 3,319
ALEXANDER, P. (1963) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1963.tb00798.x · Cited by 2,854
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Popper, K. R., & Weiss, G. (1959) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.3060577 · Cited by 2,717
Popper, K. R. (1958) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2551048 · Cited by 1,849
N., E., & Popper, K. (1935) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2016612 · Cited by 1,424
Popper, K. (1935) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-7091-4177-9 · Cited by 982
The Open Society and its Enemies
RITCHIE, A. D. (1946) · Nature · doi:10.1038/157387a0 · Cited by 867
Cited by
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Lakatos, I. (1970) · Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139171434.009 · Cited by 4,649
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
Lakatos, I. (1976) · Can Theories be Refuted? · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1863-0_14 · Cited by 3,915
The preregistration revolution
Nosek, B. A., Ebersole, C. R., DeHaven, A. C., & Mellor, D. T. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1708274114 · Cited by 1,998
Meehl, P. E. (1978) · Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-006x.46.4.806 · Cited by 1,947
Generalizing Generalizability in Information Systems Research
Lee, A. S., & Baskerville, R. L. (2003) · Information Systems Research · doi:10.1287/isre.14.3.221.16560 · Cited by 1,551
Metadata
- Authors
- Kuhn, T. S.
- Venue
- Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1970-09-02
- Pages
- 1-24
- OpenAlex
- W1621011477
- Cited by
- 673
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 35.22
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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