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Cited by 965Economic Theory and InstitutionsConservation, Biodiversity, and Resource ManagementExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Ostrom, Elinor·2015·Cambridge University Press eBooks
DOI 10.1017/cbo9781316423936
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Abstract

The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

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Metadata

Authors
Ostrom, E.
Venue
Cambridge University Press eBooks
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Published
2015-09-23
DOI
10.1017/cbo9781316423936
OpenAlex
W4253773297
Cited by
965
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 127 · 2025: 141 · 2024: 101 · 2023: 85 · 2022: 80 · 2021: 117 · 2020: 95 · 2019: 61 · 2018: 87 · 2017: 43 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 5
FWCI
52.59
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 12 d)
Locations
Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Global and Planetary Change › Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
commons governance, common-pool resources, tragedy of the commons, institutional analysis, state control of natural resources, privatization, voluntary organizations, meadows, forests, irrigation communities, water rights, fisheries, natural resource policy

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