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HIGHER-ORDER EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY
Open accessAbstract
This paper concerns would-be necessary connections between doxastic attitudes about the epistemic statuses of your doxastic attitudes, or ‘higher-order epistemic attitudes’, and the epistemic statuses of those doxastic attitudes. I will argue that, in some situations, it can be reasonable for a person to believe p and to suspend judgment about whether believing p is reasonable for her. This will set the stage for an account of the virtue of intellectual humility, on which humility is a matter of your higher-order epistemic attitudes. Recent discussions in the epistemology of disagreement have assumed that the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns whether you ought to change your doxastic attitude towards p. My conclusion here suggests an alternative approach, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper doxastic attitude to adopt concerning the epistemic status of your doxastic attitude towards p.
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Citations
Cites
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
Kelly, T. (2005) · Oxford Studies In Epistemology · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.003.0007 · Cited by 598
Cited by
Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations
Whitcomb, D., Battaly, H., Baehr, J., & Howard‐Snyder, D. (2017) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12228 · Cited by 610
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
Worsnip, A. (2018) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12246 · Cited by 317
Clarifying the Content of Intellectual Humility: A Systematic Review and Integrative Framework
Porter, T., Baldwin, C. R., Warren, M. T., Murray, E. D., Cotton Bronk, K., Forgeard, M. J. C., Snow, N. E., & Jayawickreme, E. (2022) · Journal of Personality Assessment · doi:10.1080/00223891.2021.1975725 · Cited by 155
Intellectual Humility: An Interpersonal Theory
Priest, M. (2017) · Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.016 · Cited by 81
Educating for Intellectual Humility and Conviction
Pritchard, D. (2020) · Journal of Philosophy of Education · doi:10.1111/1467-9752.12422 · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Hazlett, A.
- Venue
- Episteme
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2012-09
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 205-223
- ISSN
- 1742-3600 (ISSN-L)
- 1750-0117
- OpenAlex
- W1991889923
- Cited by
- 181
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 20.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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