The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox
Open accessAbstract
According to the Olson paradox, larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering their interests. We address the issue in a model with three distinctive features: explicit intergroup interaction, collective prizes with a varying mix of public and private characteristics, and nonlinear lobbying costs. The interplay of these features leads to new results. When the cost of lobbying has the elasticity of a quadratic function, or higher, larger groups are more effective no matter how private the prize. With smaller elasticities, a threshold degree of publicness is enough to overturn the Olson argument, and this threshold tends to zero as the elasticity approaches the value for a quadratic function. We also demonstrate that these results are true, irrespective of whether we examine group sizes over the cross-section in some given equilibrium or changes in the size of a given group over different equilibria.
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Cites
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Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
Tullock, G. (2001) · Efficient Rent-Seeking · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-5055-3_2 · Cited by 1,910
Skaperdas, S. (1996) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01213906 · Cited by 1,342
The Possibility of Cooperation
Kollock, P., Argyle, M., Hinde, R. A., Groebel, J., & Ostrom, E. (1992) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2075554 · Cited by 856
The Critical Mass in Collective Action.
Macy, M. W., Marwell, G., & Oliver, P. (1994) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2074274 · Cited by 818
Collective Action: Theory and Applications
Sandler, T. M. (1992) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 731
One for all: the logic of group conflict
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-2435 · Cited by 617
The Paradox of Group Size in Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. II.
Oliver, P. E., & Marwell, G. (1988) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2095728 · Cited by 554
Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (1999) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2549 · Cited by 553
Self-citationProvision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size
Chamberlin, J. R. (1974) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400117496 · Cited by 426
Cited by
Persistence of power, Elites, and institutions
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.267 · Cited by 1,268
Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya
Miguel, E., & Gugerty, M. K. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.09.004 · Cited by 1,176
Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest Management
Poteete, A. R., & Ostrom, E. (2004) · Development and Change · doi:10.1111/j.1467-7660.2004.00360.x · Cited by 667
Polarization: Concepts, Measurement, Estimation
Duclos, J.-Y., Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (2004) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00552.x · Cited by 606
Self-citationLinking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization
Esteban, J., & Ray, D. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1345 · Cited by 388
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Metadata
- Authors
- Esteban, J., & Ray, D.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2001-09
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 663-672
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2135945228
- Cited by
- 379
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 11.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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