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Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation
Abstract
Why are government bureaus not necessarily organized to implement policy effectively? One view holds that a main culprit is political uncertainty. Elected officials know that they will not hold office forever, so they use “insulating” structures that constrain bureaucratic discretion, making bureaus less subject to sabotage but also less effective. I revise this theory by modeling how public officials choose administrative structures. I show that in systems with few veto points, groups will be most likely to act cooperatively on policy when political uncertainty is greatest. In contrast, in systems with many veto points, only electorally weak groups will insulate policies from future interference, therefore shifting focus from uncertainty to electoral strength. Because the conditions that lead to policy insulation are rare, electoral competition should not be thought of as a primary cause of bureaucratic inefficiency.
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Citations
Cites
Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action
Bendor, J., & Mookherjee, D. (1987) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1960782 · Cited by 197
Cited by
Powell, R. (2006) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818306060061 · Cited by 585
Gilardi, F. (2005) · The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science · doi:10.1177/0002716204271833 · Cited by 431
The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information
POWELL, R. (2004) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540400111x · Cited by 283
Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability
Dunning, T. (2005) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002705277521 · Cited by 263
Sasso, G., & Morelli, M. (2021) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104497 · Cited by 43
Metadata
- Authors
- DE FIGUEIREDO, R. J. P.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2002-06
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 321-333
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2146780019
- Cited by
- 182
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 36.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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