The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action
Abstract
Work by Axelrod, Hardin, and Taylor indicates that problems of repeated collective action may lessen if people use decentralized strategies of reciprocity to induce mutual cooperation. Hobbes's centralized solution may thus be overrated. We investigate these issues by representing ongoing collective action as an n-person repeated prisoner's dilemma. The results show that decentralized conditional cooperation can ease iterated collective action dilemmas—if all players perfectly monitor the relation between individual choices and group payoffs. Once monitoring uncertainty is introduced, such strategies degrade rapidly in value, and centrally administered selective incentives become relatively more valuable. Most importantly, we build on a suggestion of Herbert Simon by showing that a hierarchical structure, with reciprocity used in subunits and selective incentives centrally administered, combines the advantages of the decentralized and centralized solutions. This hierarchical form is more stable than the decentralized structure and often secures more cooperation than the centralized structure. Generally, the model shows that the logic of repeated decision making has significant implications for the institutional forms of collective action.
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Citations
Cites
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement
Gouldner, A. W. (1960) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2092623 · Cited by 12,001
Dawes, R. M. (1980) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.001125 · Cited by 2,022
Hardin, R. (1982) · doi:10.56021/9780801828188 · Cited by 1,230
Cited by
Остром, Э. (2010) · Public Administration Issues · doi:10.17323/1999-5431-2010-0-1-5-52 · Cited by 2,850
A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261849 · Cited by 1,805
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y · Cited by 1,482
Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
Henrich, J. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5 · Cited by 1,096
Social Traps and the Problem of Trust
Rothstein, B. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490323 · Cited by 929
Metadata
- Authors
- Bendor, J., & Mookherjee, D.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1987-03
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 129-154
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2069047386
- Cited by
- 197
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 33.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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